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ABSTRACT 
Mathematics anxiety is a negative affective reaction to situations involving mathematical 
thought and is commonly believed to reduce cognitive functioning by impairing the 
efficient use of working memory resources.  The conventional theory describes that the 
processing disadvantage associated with high levels of math anxiety increasingly impairs 
performance as working memory demands increase in a math task.  Despite this 
convention, recent reports demonstrate that the high math anxious disadvantage can be 
measured in tasks that are relatively free of working memory assistance (Maloney, 
Ansari, & Fugelang, 2011; Maloney, Risko, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2010).  The present 
study examines these relatively low level effects in college adults.  A dual task paradigm 
was designed to test the engagement of different processing faculties in number 
comparison (Experiment 1) and enumeration (Experiment 2).  The results of the present 
study mostly replicated the math anxiety effects reported in the literature; however, the 
dual task settings provide key insight into their interpretation.  The results obtained are 
explained in the context of the Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007), and reasoning is provided for the extension of the math anxiety construct 
to include components related to attentional control.  Finally, implications drawn from 
this extension are used to explore the interaction between math anxiety and achievement 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990’s, toy producer Mattel introduced a new line to its popular 
Barbie doll franchise called the “Teen Talk Barbie”.  Designed to speak to an older 
generation of Barbie enthusiasts, the doll was built to play scripted recordings like, “Let’s 
go shopping!” or “Want to have a pizza party?”  However one line in particular, “Math 
class is tough!” enraged women’s advocacy groups, firmly placing the doll in infamy.  
The controversy behind this phrase came with allegations that it promoted negative 
stereotypes regarding women’s roles in the science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) fields.  Mattel promptly replaced the dolls with ones that did not 
mention mathematics (New York Times, 1992).  
 Note that this is not the only instance of businesses selling products displaying 
this negative stereotype.  Retailer Forever 21 and department store JC Penny have 
stocked their shelves with products reading, “I’m too pretty to do math!” and similar 
messages.  Importantly, these seemingly innocuous phrases were said to promote an 
apathetic disposition toward mathematics to young women. 
 So how influential are these instances of “math bashing”?  The relevant literature 
is split on this topic.  For example, recent work investigating the “gender gap” in 
mathematics shows negligible differences in math performance between boys and girls 
(Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 2008); however other research has shown that 
if you prime women with the negative stereotype that men perform better in math than 
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women, then women tend to perform worse in math tests compared to their male peers 
(Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Krendl, Richeson, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2008). 
 Regardless of the actual impact these messages may have on our youth, female or 
otherwise, it is important to note that the domain of mathematics is the true target of this 
“math bashing”, a sentiment rarely expressed for other educational realms in our culture.  
In fact, if any well-adjusted adult in our society would express the equivalent phrase, 
“Reading is tough!”, we might pass negative judgment on that individual.  Nevertheless, 
even with basic mathematical skills contributing to the foundations of literacy in our 
society, individuals freely admit to having less than adequate skill in the domain, 
admitting to be unable to calculate a tip on a bill, for example, and receiving positive 
feedback from peers about this inadequacy. 
 One potential reason for this free and even boastful negative sentiment towards 
mathematics is that, as Barbie herself claimed, “Math class is tough!”  Geary (1995; 
2000) published an interesting comment on the domain, making a distinction between 
biologically primary and secondary competencies.  As a way to illustrate this distinction, 
Geary describes that a biologically primary capacity for human language learning does 
not simply transfer to the abilities of writing or reading, two biologically secondary 
abilities.  According to Geary, among other implicit abilities, the basic mathematical 
principles of recognizing the numerosity of sets, small number counting, and even basic 
arithmetical relations like addition and subtraction are biologically primary.  That is, 
regardless of culture or level of education, these basic competencies are demonstrated 
without significant variation in expression, and are found quite early in development.  
Conversely, biologically secondary competencies, including larger number computation, 
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and more complex arithmetical operations such as multiplication or division, are learned 
only through explicit instruction, and require significant effort on the part of the 
individual to practice and ascertain the principles involved.  Note that the implication 
here is that any biologically secondary competency would require significant effort to 
master.  So, with regard to the “math bashing” just described, it is easy to see why Barbie 
would hold the opinion she does about the domain.  Simply put, math takes effort. 
 Another plausible reason for this blatantly negative outlook towards mathematics 
is the fact that math requires a significant degree of mental effort to achieve proficiency 
in its concepts, even if the process is sufficiently practiced.  As we will discuss 
throughout this work, the procedures inherent in mathematical processing have been 
shown to be heavily reliant on a limited-capacity mental mechanism known as working 
memory (DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004; Raghubar, Barnes, & Hecht, 2010).  Interestingly, 
this mechanism has been implicated at almost any level of math computation, regardless 
of the complexity of the problem.  Put in another way, Barbie is warranted in believing 
that math is tough because, regardless of the kind of mathematical task she needs to 
complete, the processing required is most likely to be mentally taxing.  It is this topic, the 
level of cognitive strain experienced while performing mathematical tasks that I will be 
exploring in the present study. 
 The purpose of the present experiments is to examine the contribution of the 
working memory system in mathematical tasks thought to be free of its assistance during 
calculation.  Recent work has been published with this critical assumption at the heart of 
its arguments, and has exploited a large and long-standing gap in the literature.  Briefly, 
the developing literature has shown that mathematics anxiety, an aversive and potentially 
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debilitating reaction to mathematical problem solving, influences reaction time (RT) and 
accuracy in two relatively simple numerical tasks: enumeration and magnitude 
comparison (Maloney, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2011; Maloney, Risko, Ansari, & 
Fugelsang, 2010).  The authors’ conclusions regarding their results rest on two robust 
associations with mathematics anxiety in the extant literature.  One of these relates to the 
literature suggesting that math anxiety serves to undermine otherwise normal working 
memory function (Ashcraft & Moore, 2009).  As we will discuss shortly, it has been 
suggested that math anxiety results in a transitory depletion of working memory 
resources when participants engage with mathematical problem solving.  The other 
potential conclusion appealed to the association between math anxiety and overall poorer 
mathematical achievement (Hembree, 1990; Ma, 1999). 
 The purpose of this study, then, is to examine these two possible explanations for 
the worse performance of high math anxious individuals in relatively simple 
mathematical tasks.  More specifically, the present study examines the interrelations of 
working memory, mathematics anxiety, and mathematical achievement in pursuit of 
explaining the high math anxiety disadvantage just described.  As such, reviews relevant 
to these three constructs are presented prior to the descriptions of the two experiments 
reported here. 
Working Memory 
Imagine the following scenario: 
 After completing his chores, George’s mother gave him a 5 dollar bill that he 
could use at the local grocery store to buy candy.  George decides that he wants to 
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buy as many jaw breakers as he can without exceeding his $5 limit.  If each jaw 
breaker costs 38 cents, how many jaw breakers can George buy? 
How should George go about finding the number of jaw breakers he can purchase?  
Assuming George is advanced enough in math education, and calculation can be made 
manually, then he could quickly divide 5.0 by .38 and find the solution to the problem.  
Assuming this problem becomes apparent at the store, however, and manual calculation 
is not possible, then George is forced to compute the division mentally, which is no small 
task to complete.  Another strategy could be to add the price of each jaw breaker 
repeatedly until the running total reaches the $5 dollar limit.  Although not as complex as 
the division, this mental calculation is still slow, error-prone, and mentally taxing (Logie, 
Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994) 
 This example illustrates the idea that throughout an average day, an individual can 
encounter numerous situations that require quick, decisive, and accurate mental 
calculation. This skill is commonly called upon—calculating the tip on a restaurant bill or 
calculating the cost difference between sale and non-sale items at a store, for example.  
Inherent in these scenarios is the need to maintain many pieces of information in memory 
while performing multi-step procedures to reach a final solution.  These acts of 
maintenance, integration, and storage of information are vitally reliant on a mental 
mechanism known as working memory. 
 At the surface of the construct, working memory is thought to be a limited-
capacity mechanism that manipulates, integrates, and temporarily stores information at 
the forefront of an individual’s attention (Engle, 2002; Miyake & Shah, 1999; Raghubar 
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et al., 2010; DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004).  It has been implicated in a wide array of 
cognitive domains including learning and memory, and has been implicated as 
contributing to fluid intelligence (Engle, 2002; Miyake & Shah, 1999).  More recently, 
the field of mathematical cognition has also come to appreciate its importance 
(DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004; Raghubar et al., 2010).    The field has learned that whether 
engaged in rather simple activities such as basic counting (Hecht, 2002) or in more 
complex procedures such as addition (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001) or multiplication (Imbo & 
Vandierendonck, 2007b), working memory plays an important role in math-related tasks. 
 Many models describing the function of this mechanism exist, ranging from 
domain-general capacities of attention (Engle, 2002) to domain-specific, multicomponent 
accounts (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999).  The largest distinction 
between most models involves the nature of the resources utilized when performing 
complex mental procedures—either that these resources are found in an unspecified pool 
of resources, or that the resources are contained within domain specific modules of the 
mechanism.  Researchers in math cognition have primarily focused on the 
multicomponent model and more specifically through the lens of the specific model 
proposed by Baddeley and colleagues (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 
1999). 
 The Baddeley multicomponent model specifies the network of three main 
subcomponents: the central executive, the phonological loop, and the visuospatial 
sketchpad (VSSP).  The employment of these subcomponents is somewhat hierarchical in 
responsibility. The central executive is thought to manage the system, actuating processes 
like basic attention, task-switching, and integrating the information temporarily stored by 
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the two “slave” systems, the phonological loop and VSSP.  The phonological loop is 
specifically responsible for language based information and processes like active 
rehearsal and storage of such information.  The VSSP plays a similar role, however 
exclusively for visual or imagery-based information (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; see 
Baddeley, 2000 for a recent extension of this model). 
 To examine the role of working memory, two experimental approaches are 
commonly adopted.  In the individual differences approach, participants’ behavior is 
measured in the task of interest and performance is analyzed between groups of 
participants that vary by their working memory capacities.  Essentially, the participants 
are also tested in an independent task measuring working memory to determine the 
functional upper limit of individuals’ working memory capacity.  The reason for this is to 
assess the maximum amount of processing that can occur with each individual’s limited 
availability of cognitive resources.  The participants are then grouped by their capacity 
into low, medium, and high capacity groups, and it is these three categories that are 
compared.  Typical results from this type of investigation show less efficient and more 
error prone performance on a math test, for example, in the low compared to high 
capacity groups.  To be sure, the low capacity group is already hindered by a small 
capacity limit, so the heavy demands of complex cognitive processing are dealt with less 
proficiently than those with larger capacities (Seyler, Kirk, & Ashcraft, 2003). 
 Instead of relying on two separate measures to examine the role of working 
memory in complex cognitive tasks, the second paradigm integrates the two into a “dual 
task” procedure.  Basically, behavior is measured in the task of interest (primary task) 
while the participant concurrently meets the demands of another, unrelated task assumed 
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to tax working memory (secondary task).  Importantly, each task is also completed in 
isolation to ensure a measure of baseline performance without additional cognitive load.  
The rationale for this paradigm is to introduce processing interference such that impaired 
performance on either task with concurrent processing, but not in the control trials, 
indicates mutual reliance on the same working memory resources.  Of course, the 
observation of little to no impairment under concurrent processing indicates independent 
processes that are not in competition for working memory.  Because researchers can pair 
primary and secondary tasks that employ working memory resources from the same 
subcomponent, the field can assess the specific role of each working memory domain in 
mathematical processing. 
 Importantly, both of these approaches have been tested in the same study, and 
results obtained from both procedures yielded similar patterns of behavior.  For example, 
Seyler, Kirk, and Ashcraft (2003) tested performance in a simple subtraction task. 
Participants demonstrated the expected results, strong problem size effects in Experiment 
1; that is, participants showed pronounced spikes in reaction time when calculating 
subtractions with a double-digit minuend than single-digit minuends (e.g. 11-4, 11 is the 
minuend).  This large problem impairment suggested that calculation relied on slower, 
and perhaps more demanding processes in this type of problem.  To test this hypothesis, 
Seyler et al. first recorded the participants’ working memory capacities individually to 
form the low, medium, and high capacity groups, and then tested the simple subtraction 
facts in a dual task setting (Experiment 4).  Here, the secondary task required holding 2, 
4, or 6 randomly sequenced letters in memory for later recall after completion of the 
primary task. 
  9 
 The results were quite transparent.  First, letter recall performance degraded in the 
dual task trials compared to control trials.  These results suggested that mental subtraction 
does, indeed, rely on working memory resources.  The second set of results demonstrated 
individual differences in working memory capacity and performance in the dual task 
setting.  That is, the spike in errors from control to dual task trials was much larger in the 
low capacity group than the high capacity group, showing particular disadvantage of the 
low capacity group to perform even simple subtraction problems in the presence of 
additional yet irrelevant cognitive processing.  Crucially, the extent to which this low 
capacity disadvantage affected performance depended on how much additional 
processing was introduced by the secondary task.  When the additional load was light (2 
letter load), capacity groups did not differ.  By comparison, the low capacity group made 
almost twice as many errors in letter recall (56%) as the high span group (31%) when the 
secondary load was heaviest (6 letter load).  These differences showed that it is not the 
simple case that the low capacity group was just worse at subtraction, but that the low 
capacity disadvantage was exacerbated in situations of heavy and complex cognitive 
processing. 
 The results from Seyler et al. (2003) serve to establish the importance of the 
working memory mechanism in mental arithmetic while also illustrating the two most 
common techniques for demonstrating its involvement.  Because the secondary task 
involved the simple memorization of letters, the assumption can be made that the 
phonological loop carried the majority of the processing burden in this last example.  Of 
course, this would lead to the conclusion that phonological resources are needed while 
completing subtraction problems.  With this example in mind, we now turn to a 
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discussion of the literature exploring the exact use of resources specific to each individual 
sub-component of the Baddeley working memory model.  
Subcomponents 
 As stated previously, the attraction of the multicomponent model is the ability to 
isolate the different subcomponents’ processing.  This method is fruitful; not only can we 
better understand the use of working memory resources within mathematical processes, 
but we can also take a closer look at the specific kind of processing used in different 
mathematical capacities.  We will revisit this point throughout this work, as its 
implications have fueled the development of the present study.  Before delving into the 
intricacies of these relationships, however, I will describe the responsibilities of the 
subcomponents in mental arithmetic.  First I will describe the literature implicating the 
two slave system components, followed by a description of the role of the central 
executive. 
Slave Systems 
 The slave systems, phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad (VSSP), are 
thought to be independent subcomponents whose resources are employed by the central 
executive.  Because of this independence, the field has sought to explore their unique 
responsibilities in mental arithmetic.  At first glance, the evidence supporting the 
responsibilities of each slave system seems inconsistent or convoluted (DeStefano & 
LeFevre, 2004; Raghubar et al., 2010).  However, as noted by DeStefano and LeFevre, 
the results obtained in these investigations often rely on many methodological factors that 
are not held standard from one experiment to the next.  For example, the horizontal or 
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vertical orientation of the problem (Imbo & LeFevre, 2010; Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003), 
the modality of problem presentation (Heathcote, 1994; Logie et al., 1994), and even the 
mathematical operation tested (Lee & Kang, 2002; Seyler et al., 2003) can determine 
which, and to what extent, slave system resources are engaged.  Despite these 
idiosyncrasies in the literature, the over-arching roles of these subcomponents are 
apparent, and it is these qualities we will review in this section. 
Phonological Loop 
 Of the two slave systems, the majority of research has been conducted to 
investigate the role of the phonological loop in mental arithmetic.  Generally speaking, 
this subcomponent is thought to be responsible for the manipulation and temporary 
storage of verbal qualities of information.  To load the processing capacity of this 
mechanism, researchers have commonly chosen to ask participants to memorize strings 
of information, typically letters, to be recalled after completion of the primary task 
(Seyler et al., 2003).  Furthermore, the act of repeated verbalization of letters (Hecht, 
2002), or memorization of non-words (Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003) have also been used.  
Essentially, the secondary task has been designed to tax the component’s capacity for 
storage or active rehearsal. 
 Most commonly, the consequence of a concurrent phonological load is associated 
with detriments in procedure execution during calculation, for example, when using 
counting procedures to solve arithmetic problems if direct retrieval is not used (Hecht, 
2002; Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2007a; Seyler et al., 2003), transformation strategies in 
addition and subtraction (Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2007a) or having to maintain 
intermediate values of complex problems, as in multi-digit addition or multiplication 
  12 
(Ashcraft, 1995; Heathcote, 1994; Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2007b; Logie et al., 1994; 
Seitz & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2002).  The common thread of these studies is degraded 
performance in strategy use during calculation if the phonological loop is taxed.  For 
example, when in a task that requires a running total of additions, concurrent letter 
memorization results in poorer performance than when the secondary task demands are 
not present (Logie et al., 1994). 
Visuospatial Sketchpad  
 The established role of the VSSP is similar to that of the phonological loop, 
however the VSSP is thought to manipulate and temporarily store visual or imagery 
based information.  Common techniques for loading this component include asking 
participants to remember the visual attributes of objects in arrays (Fougnie & Marios, 
2009), or a sequence of target locations on a computer screen (Corsi block test: Geary, 
Hoard, Byrd-Craven, & DeSoto, 2004). 
 The noted confusion in subcomponent involvement in arithmetic is most likely 
attributable to the results obtained while examining the VSSP.  On the whole, it appears 
that its most obvious role is manipulation and storage of numerical information in 
problems where procedure execution relies on the physical arrangement of the problem.  
To illustrate this point, researchers have found involvement of the VSSP in the 
subtraction operation, especially in borrow procedures, presumably because of the visual 
nature of physically borrowing from the tens to the ones column (Imbo & LeFevre, 2010; 
Lee & Kang, 2002).  In contrast, such involvement of the component is absent in 
multiplication, which is consistent with the idea that multiplication facts are stored in 
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verbal, not visual, neural codes—therefore not requiring visual resources (Campbell, 
1997).   
 Interestingly, some of the strongest support for these claims comes from 
developmental investigations.  Throughout development, children are continually 
confronted with new mathematical operations or procedures, and the common trajectory 
of gaining proficiency in these operations is to commit the basic “facts” of each number 
pair to memory.  This process, then, involves permanent storage of verbal relationships 
between the digits.  So, when younger children are tested in a multiplication primary task, 
for example, more interference is observed with concurrent VSSP load than a 
phonological load, due to the fact that these children have not yet committed the facts to 
memory, and rely on the physical components of the task to reach a solution.  As children 
age, however, both VSSP and phonological loads degrade performance, as the strategies 
used to find a solution rely on the visual nature of calculation, as well as verbal retrieval 
from long-term memory (McKenzie, Bull, & Gray, 2003; see Siegler, 1996 for an 
account of developmental shifts in calculation strategies). 
Central Executive 
 Although the roles of the two slave systems may be less than clear, evidence 
supporting the responsibilities of the central executive is quite cohesive.  The umbrella 
role of the central executive is to coordinate, manipulate, and integrate information stored 
by the two slave systems.  These duties seem to reflect the system’s capability to inhibit 
irrelevant information, task switch, and follow problem solving algorithms through to 
their completion (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). 
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 To tax this component’s processing, two common methods are used; both 
requiring active processing while the primary task is being completed.  The first 
technique is random letter generation (speaking strings of letters in a random order; 
Hecht, 2002). The second technique, the continuous choice reaction time task, requires 
the participant to indicate, via button press, if a sound presented during the primary task 
was a high or low tone (Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2007b; Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & 
Kemps, 2005).  Essentially, the tasks attempt to burden limited capacity resources 
without loading the slave systems’ temporary storage capacities. 
 Perhaps one of the reasons the evidence regarding the central executive seems so 
clear-cut is that loading this component interferes with almost any level of calculation, 
for example, being implicated in single fact calculation, regardless of operation 
scrutinized (DeRammelaere, Stuyven, & Vandierendonck,  1999; Hecht, 2002; Imbo & 
Vandierendonck, 2007a, 2007b; Lemaire, Abdi, & Fayol, 1996; Seitz & Schumann-
Hengsteler, 2000).  Interestingly, this component’s widespread involvement in low-level 
calculation is even found in simple counting strategies in coordination with the 
phonological loop (Camos & Barrouillet, 2004; Hecht, 2002). 
 As an example, Hecht (2002) examined the role of working memory resources in 
the selection and execution of calculation strategies in addition verification (deciding if 
the fully provided addition equation is correctly stated or not).  Of course, the primary 
task was the verification; however two different secondary tasks were administered.  The 
first, taxing phonological processing, required the repeated verbalization of one letter of 
the alphabet, also known as articulatory suppression.  The other secondary task, taxing 
central executive processing, required participants to verbalize a self-created random 
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sequence of letters while verifying the addition equations.  At the end of each trial, 
participants indicated the calculation strategy used during completion of the primary task. 
 Importantly, working memory load did not influence the selection of strategies 
used by the participant; however it did affect the efficiency of the strategy used.  
Essentially, the presence of either secondary task impaired accurate responding, however 
only the concurrent central executive load caused slower RT in the verification process 
when simple counting strategies were selected for calculation (Hecht, 2002). 
 In terms of its more complicated duties, the central executive has been implicated 
in strategies involving the transformation of digits (e.g. transforming 7 + 9  to 7 + 10 – 1), 
as well as any calculation requiring the carry operation, as in addition (Fürst & Hitch, 
2000; Imbo, Vandierendonck, & De Rammelaere, 2007; Seitz & Schumann-Hengsteler, 
2000, 2002).  Furthermore, executive resources are increasingly involved in situations 
where calculation requires increasing numbers of carries (Imbo, Vandierendonck, & 
Verguewe, 2007), and also in situations requiring maintenance and updating of 
cumulative sums (Fürst & Hitch, 2000). 
 In sum, the literature indicates two crucial aspects of the working memory system.  
One of these is that the processing capacity of an individual can be measured, creating an 
individual difference variable that is meaningful for mathematical problem solving.  The 
second, and perhaps the most fruitful for the field, is that working memory resource 
employment in mathematical tasks can be manipulated in the dual task paradigm.  
Moreover, researchers can manipulate specific domains of processing in these tasks, in 
accord with the multicomponent model of working memory.  This experimental 
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technique allows for well specified and theoretically relevant processing competition to 
take place, with results speaking to the nature of mental calculation.  It also allows for 
analysis of the processing domains of certain mathematical procedures. 
 This final point brings us to one of the goals of current investigation, that is, a 
dual task experimental setting that investigates the need for working memory 
involvement in basic mathematical procedures.  More specifically, the processing 
employed when comparing symbolic magnitudes and object enumeration were 
investigated along-side secondary tasks taxing the three subcomponents of the 
multicomponent model individually.  To make the impetus of this experiment 
transparent, however, two almost seemingly unrelated topics must first be examined—the 
first of these topics is the role mathematics anxiety is believed to play in mathematical 
tasks. 
Math Anxiety and the Triple Task Effect 
 As illustrated in the previous section, mathematical processing is a complex, and 
potentially fragile mental capacity (see Moore, McAuley, Allred, & Ashcraft, in press for 
further review).  Again, the dual task paradigm allows the field to manipulate, with a high 
degree of specificity, the efficiency and accuracy of this capacity.  Another dimension of 
this capability we will consider is the role of an affective reaction to the domain of 
mathematics, mathematics anxiety, and how its presence is believed to alter the 
relationship between math processing and working memory.  Before exploring this 
dimension, however, I will first describe the research establishing math anxiety’s 
influence in math problem solving and the route through which this condition is thought 
to operate. 
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 In an attempt to characterize math anxiety, Richardson and Suinn (1972) 
originally defined the construct as, “a feeling of tension and anxiety that interferes with 
the manipulation of numbers and the solving of mathematical problems in a wide variety 
of ordinary life and academic situations” (p. 551).  Indeed, the effects associated with 
math anxiety can be observed in such commonplace situations such as calculating a tip on 
a restaurant bill, through more complex situations such as completing standardized math 
exams.  In the laboratory, the associated effects of math anxiety have been observed in 
low-level activities such as simple counting (Maloney et al. 2010) or number comparison 
(Maloney et al. 2011), with increasing influence as computation complexity increases 
(Ashcraft, 1995; Moore et al., in press).  Perhaps surprisingly, it is this pervasive 
influence that has led some to characterize mathematics anxiety as a phobic disorder 
(Faust, 1988), with support of this characterization coming from Ashcraft (2002), who 
described a testing session in which a participant burst into tears reportedly because of 
the anxiety experienced in a simple subtraction task. 
 Early research on the construct established many important relationships between 
math anxiety, and personal as well as educational factors.  These relationships, reported 
in two meta-analyses on the topic (Hembree, 1990; Ma, 1999), further demonstrate the 
breadth of this condition.  For example, mathematics anxiety is correlated -.82 with 
mathematics self-efficacy (belief in one’s own abilities), -.64 with the motivation to excel 
or pursue more advanced mathematical topics, and, not surprisingly, -.75 with enjoyment 
of math in pre-college samples (-.47 in college samples).  These relationships clearly 
communicate the idea that an individual who experiences math anxiety does not 
habitually approach situations involving mathematics. For this reason, we have begun 
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characterizing math anxiety as an emotional avoidance of mathematics (Ashcraft & 
Moore, 2009), correlating -.32 with intent to enroll in future math courses in college 
samples.  Because these conclusions are drawn from correlational research, we cannot 
comment on the causality of these relationships, however, we do see disturbing 
relationships between math anxiety and overall math performance.  Pre-college math 
achievement correlates -.34 with math anxiety (-.31 in college), and high school grades 
correlate -.30 (-.27 in college).   
These results represent the traditional method for studying math anxiety, to 
establish meaningful relationships between important and relevant educational constructs.  
More recently, the area has turned to the laboratory to investigate the potential routes of 
influence this affective reaction has on mental processes.  In brief, the field has found 
strong evidence of impairment of the working memory mechanism in association with 
high levels of math anxiety (see Moore & Ashcraft, 2012; 2013).  This connection 
between the affective state and working memory function has been shown to be quite 
strong, with associated impairments found from low-level capacities to complex 
operations. 
 Early math anxiety research was rather straight-forward, and paralleled the 
rationale of early working memory research.  More specifically, participants were asked 
to complete standard math tasks after the completion of math anxiety self-report scales.  
Then, the subsequent analyses explored performance in relation to low, medium, and 
high math anxious participant groups (Ashcraft & Faust, 1994; Faust, 1988; Faust, 
Ashcraft, & Fleck, 1996; see Ashcraft, 1995; 2002 for reviews).  Briefly, these early 
examinations established some of the hallmarks of this condition. 
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 In verification tasks of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, Ashcraft 
and colleagues noted that math anxiety did not have a strong effect on retrieval processes, 
due to the notion that the retrieval of math facts required little to no working memory 
capacity.  Additionally, in more difficult math problems like two column addition, low 
math anxious participants typically completed the tasks more quickly and accurately than 
the high math anxious.  Moreover, if the high anxious did complete the task as quickly as 
the low anxious, they were often much less accurate.  This behavior, a speed/accuracy 
trade-off, suggested in-task avoidance in the high anxious individuals—it is as if they 
were responding as quickly as they could to simply end their participation requirements 
without much care for the accuracy of their responses. 
 Another hallmark observed in these exploratory studies was the level of 
impairment in those who rated themselves as high math anxious compared to those who 
reported low levels of anxiety.  For example, in more complex, and thus more working 
memory demanding situations such as two column addition, high math anxious 
participants demonstrated difficulty in arriving at the solution of each problem—larger 
latencies and more errors.  Importantly, this trend was exaggerated in situations where 
calculation required the carry operation.  This last finding was instrumental in creating 
the hypothesis that math anxiety operated through the working memory mechanism, 
interrupting the normal, albeit restricted, online function of this mechanism (Eysenck, & 
Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  As we will discuss shortly, it 
is this comment, that mathematical anxiety is likely compromising available working 
memory resources and leading to an exaggerated deficit not experienced by low anxious 
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participants that influenced researchers to investigate math anxiety in the dual task 
paradigm. 
The triple task effect 
 The literature regarding working memory demonstrates that mathematical 
processing is complex and requires working memory resources, and that if another task is 
to be completed concurrently, then the working memory resources fall under competition 
from the two procedures.  Now that research hypothesizes that mathematics anxiety 
exhausts working memory resources, then those high in math anxiety should perform 
especially worse in a dual task procedure compared to the low anxious.  Essentially, math 
anxiety is creating an online disadvantage for high math anxious because it would 
diminish the total number of available resources. 
 Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) set out to investigate this hypothesis in a dual task 
setting with one- and two-digit addition, and letter string memorization as the secondary 
task.  Trial procedure was such that a string of letters (2 or 6 letters in length) was 
presented until the participant was confident of their memory.  Then, the addition 
problem was presented, and once a solution was vocalized, a prompt for letter recall 
appeared.  Predicted results were as follows.  All participants, regardless of math anxiety 
level, would show difficulty in problems requiring a carry, especially if concurrently 
loaded with a six letter memorization.  Furthermore, this difficulty would be exaggerated 
in those who are high math anxious, due to an anxiety-restricted working memory 
capacity. 
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 In short, this is exactly what Ashcraft and Kirk found.  That is, all participants 
encountered interference in trials requiring carrying, and the interference was stronger if 
the secondary task required a six letter load.  Crucially, the math anxiety groups’ 
behavior demonstrated the predicted results—high math anxious participants, in 
conditions of carry and a six letter load, performed significantly worse (39% errors) than 
their low math anxious counterparts (20% errors). 
 The fact that the high math anxious experienced more difficulty in the most 
challenging condition compared to the low math anxious clearly demonstrates the role of 
math anxiety in the working memory mechanism.  It is as if the high math anxious must 
perform in situations where a three-way competition for mental resources is present, 
effectively creating a triple task condition to complete.  Equivalent evidence has been 
found in two-column subtraction with borrowing (Krause, Rudig, & Ashcraft, 2009).  We 
simply refer to this three-way competition for resources as a qualitative “affective drop” 
in performance, referring to the debilitating effect emotion is thought to introduce to 
cognitive processing that is only experienced in the high math anxious (Ashcraft & 
Moore, 2009; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
The Current Investigation 
The review presented here focuses on three crucial aspects of mathematical 
processing.  First, working memory resources have been shown to be an integral 
component of problem solving, with observed contributions ranging from complex 
calculation such as addition (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001) and multiplication (Imbo & 
Vandierendonck, 2007b) to simple processing such as counting (Camos & Barrouillet, 
2004; Hecht, 2002).  Second is the idea that mathematics anxiety is associated with an 
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affective reaction to mathematical problem solving, and is believed to consume working 
memory resources in math tasks specifically.  Related to these points is the third aspect of 
problem solving, that those with high math anxiety are thought to encounter an affective 
drop in performance, or a three way competition for working memory resources in the 
most challenging conditions of a mathematical task (Moore et al., in press).  As 
described, however, this affective drop in performance seems to only occur in problem 
types that are heavily demanding of working memory resources.  For example, this 
processing disadvantage is almost always absent in the small problems of studies 
investigating mental arithmetic for the solution of familiar or novel math procedures 
(e.g., Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Mattarella-Micke, Mateo, Kozak, Foster, & Beilock, 2011).   
 Despite these characteristics, two recent investigations of math anxiety 
demonstrate performance differences between high and low math anxious individuals in 
math tasks believed to be relatively low in working memory demand, namely numerical 
magnitude comparison and enumeration.  To investigate the role of mathematics anxiety 
in number comparison, Maloney, Ansari, and Fugelsang (2011) administered two 
variants of the number comparison task to participants that reported having either high or 
low mathematics anxiety.  One version required the comparison of two simultaneously 
presented single-digit Arabic digits presented on a computer screen (e.g. which is larger: 
7 or 4?).  The other version required comparison of one digit on the screen to a fixed 
standard magnitude of 5.  In both experiments, Maloney et al found a math anxiety x 
numerical distance interaction such that both groups demonstrated the classic inverse 
relationship between the numerical distance of the digits compared and reaction time (as 
distance increases, RT decreases), but also that the high math anxious demonstrated more 
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difficulty in comparing the digits as the magnitude difference became less distant (e.g. 
the RT difference between a comparison of 2 and 3 and a comparison of 2 and 8 was 
larger for the high, compared to low math anxious participants).  In a similar way, 
Maloney, Risko, Ansari, and Fugelsang (2010) showed that, in a typical enumeration 
task, that counting, but not subitizing (rapid appreciation of small sets of objects; 
Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkman, 1949; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1993; 1994a; 1994b) was 
slower in high compared to low math anxious participants, suggesting more interference 
in basic counting if anxiety was present. 
 Two considerations were offered regarding the math anxiety effects obtained in 
these low-level tasks.  The first possibility reported was that the theorized transitory 
working memory deficit experienced by high math anxious individuals was the source of 
the group differences.  The results from Maloney and colleagues’ reports partially 
support this explanation.  For example, the enumeration profiles of the anxiety groups 
diverged when working memory is implicated in processing (counting range), but not 
when enumeration is thought to proceed without assistance from the working memory 
mechanism (subitizing range).  The difficulty with this interpretation, though, comes 
from the math anxiety differences in number comparison profiles where little evidence 
implicating working memory reliance exists.  The authors note the difficulty in this 
conclusion because the extant literature does not address the exact working memory 
requirements of comparison processes. 
 The second explanation offered for the low-level math anxiety effects appeals to 
the numerical competency of low versus high math anxious individuals.  The results of a 
steeper numerical distance effect and counting function in the high math anxious suggests 
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that a process fundamental to numerical understanding is at play, although the authors 
provide little in the way of theory to describe what the nature of the deficits may be. 
 The purpose of the present study, then, is to replicate the math anxiety effects 
reported in Maloney et al. (2010; 2011) as well as to examine the two potential 
explanations offered by the authors.  The method chosen for this investigation was the 
dual-task paradigm, which was selected for the following important reasons.  First, as 
already discussed, the dual-task paradigm is a common and fruitful method for testing 
constructs in mathematical cognition.  As stated by Maloney et al. (2010) the working 
memory impairment associated with math anxiety is assumed to be transitory, meaning 
that high and low math anxious individuals are not believed to fundamentally differ in 
working memory function (but see Maloney, 2011).  Instead, the associated impairment 
is assumed to be a response to mathematical problem solving in the high math anxious, 
creating an acute processing disadvantage for this group which would be absent if other 
domains were tested.  Thus, testing high and low math anxious participants in a dual-task 
setting allows for the direct manipulation of working memory resource availability.  
Further, even if fundamental differences do exist between groups, the increase of 
processing load within the dual-task setting should only serve to make the math anxiety 
group disparity even more apparent (Maloney et al., 2011). 
 The second reason for employing the dual-task paradigm was to address the point 
raised by Maloney et al. (2011); that the extant literature does not address the working 
memory requirements of numerical magnitude comparison.  In response to this claim, the 
current study aims to examine the employment of working memory resources during the 
successful completion of number comparison and enumeration.  To this end, participants 
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completed either number comparison (Experiment 1) or enumeration (Experiment 2) as 
the primary task in a dual-task design in three separate blocks.  Importantly, each block 
represented the unique pairing of the relevant primary task with one of three secondary 
tasks designed to tax the components of Baddeley and colleagues’ working memory 
model.  As such, this study serves as the first to identify which components of working 
memory are implicated in number comparison processing, as well as to extend the 
enumeration literature by taxing each component of the working memory system in one 
sample (see Camos & Barrouillet, 2004). 
The final reason for employing the dual-task paradigm is to assess the possibility 
that mathematics anxiety is associated with different working memory components in 
different ways.  Indeed, frameworks created to describe the negative effects of general 
anxiety in cognitive processing assert that the worry associated with anxiety should 
impair central executive mechanisms more strongly than the phonological loop which 
should be impaired more than the visuospatial sketchpad (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; see also Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009).  As the ideas within these 
frameworks have formed the basis for mathematics anxiety understanding today 
(Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Moore et al., in press), their implications will be examined in the 
present study as well.   
With these ideas in mind, the present study has three goals in mind.  The first goal 
is to establish the working memory requirements of comparison processes in adults.  As 
stated, the extant literature is relatively quiet with regard to this topic, which is an 
important gap to fill in our understanding of the domain.  The second goal is to 
thoroughly investigate the math anxiety construct.  By examining task performance in 
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relation to all three of Baddeley and colleagues’ working memory components, the 
present study aims to examine which specific components are associated with the math 
anxiety disadvantage described.  The final goal of this study was to explore the 
possibility raised by Maloney and colleagues that performance differences observed 
between math anxiety groups may be attributable to the mathematical competency of the 
participants.  Because of this goal, participants completed a measure of mathematical 
achievement, and the data obtained from this assessment was considered as a potential 
mediating variable explaining math anxiety differences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 Experiment 1 was designed in an attempt to replicate the math anxiety effects 
reported in the higher/lower than 5 task variant (H/L 5; see Method) of Maloney et al. 
(2011); participants that reported higher levels of math anxiety were found to exhibit a 
steeper numerical distance effect (described below) than were their low math anxious 
counterparts.  Furthermore, the goal of the experiment was to thoroughly examine the 
working memory demands of number magnitude comparison processes to assess the 
plausibility that the working memory impairment experienced by the high math anxious 
participants could be driving the effects reported.  The final goal of the experiment was to 
assess the contribution of the mathematical competency to the performance obtained. 
 Of interest in a comparison study is the presence and magnitude of the numerical 
distance effect, whereby individuals’ reaction times increase as a function of reduced 
numerical distance separating the magnitudes being compared (Moyer & Landauer, 
1967).  This inverse relationship has been theorized to reflect the organization of 
numerical magnitude representations in the brain, and is believed to either reflect noise 
inherent in the representations themselves, or the mental “space” between each 
representation.  Thus, the numerical distance effect is thought to indicate the extent to 
which the activation of one representation overlaps or interferes with the activation of 
another during the comparison process—the closer (or noisier) the relationship between 
the magnitudes is, the more difficult it is for the individual to separate their unique 
activations in order to choose which is larger or smaller.  These notions are supported 
with developmental evidence indicating that, with increasing age and numerical 
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competency, the slope of the numerical distance effect is reduced (De Smedt, 
Verschaffel, & Ghesquière, 2009; Sekuler & Mierkiewicz, 1977).  This development is 
presumed to indicate less representational overlap with greater mathematical competency, 
either because of greater distancing of representations in the mind or reduced noise of the 
representations (Sekuler & Mierkiewicz, 1977; see also Holloway and Ansari, 2009). 
 Maloney and colleagues showed that high math anxious individuals were 
characterized as having a steeper numerical distance effect than the low math anxious in 
their samples.  Given the prevailing notion that the effect indexes the organization and 
precision with which magnitudes are represented, the authors favored the conclusion that 
the math anxiety effect might reflect the mathematical competency of the high math 
anxious in comparison to their low anxious peers.  Importantly, however, the working 
memory deficit hypothesis was mostly discarded due to the lack of evidence in the 
literature indicating the working memory demands of magnitude comparisons. 
 Thus, the results of Experiment 1 were expected to establish the working memory 
demands of number comparison.  In doing so, the working memory deficit hypothesis of 
math anxiety can be properly evaluated as a potential explanation of the math anxiety 
effects reported by Maloney et al. (2011).  Further, mathematical achievement scores 
were collected from each participant in order to evaluate the preferred conclusion that 
numerical competency was driving the math anxiety differences in the numerical distance 
effect.  By using these scores as covariates in the analyses, the results should be able to 
address if math achievement mediates the math anxiety effects observed. 
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Method 
Participants 
 A total of 51 individuals (31 females) were recruited from the University of 
Nevada Las Vegas subject pool to participate in this experiment and were granted course 
credit upon providing consent for testing.  The mean age of the sample was 20.4 years 
old. 
Materials 
 Demographic Information.  Each participant completed a short demographic 
questionnaire asking for information relating to the individual’s age, gender, year in 
school, math courses taken and grades earned, as well as two items asking for a rating of 
the individual’s enjoyment of math and mathematics anxiety. 
 Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS).  The AMAS is a 9-item questionnaire 
asking various questions regarding hypothetical ratings of experienced mathematics 
anxiety in a variety of scenarios (e.g., “Thinking about an upcoming math test one day 
before.”, “Listening to a lecture in math class.”: Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare, & Hunt, 
2003).  The scale of response ranged from “1” indicating the feeling of “Low Anxiety” to 
“5” indicating the feeling “High Anxiety”.  Responses to all items are summed to yield 
the participant’s mathematics anxiety score. 
 Wide-Range Achievement Test 3—Arithmetic Subscale.  The Wide-Range 
Achievement Test—Arithmetic Subscale (WRAT-3) is a test of mathematical 
achievement consisting of 40 problems requiring calculation.  The problems range from 
simple calculation such as simple addition through more difficult problems such as 
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simplifying algebraic expressions.  Participants were given 20 minutes to complete the 
measure.  Total correct is used as an indication of achievement. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed three blocks of dual-task trials that tested comparison 
performance as the primary task.  Each block differed by the secondary task completed 
(phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad (VSSP), and central executive).  The trials 
began with a 500ms fixation point, after which the information to be remembered within 
the respective secondary task was presented (described below).  After another 500ms 
fixation slide, one digit was presented on the screen that was to be used as a comparison 
to a fixed standard of the magnitude 5 (primary task).  The task of the participant was to 
verbally indicate if the digit presented was “higher” or “lower” than the standard.  This 
response was spoken into a microphone which acted as a voice key and stopped reaction 
time recording for this phase of the trial.  The experimenter manually recorded each 
response of the primary task phase in a research journal.  Digits presented were 1-4 and 
6-9, corresponding to numerical distances of 1 through 4.  Each numerical distance was 
sampled 24 times in each block, yielding 96 trials total.  Once a response was recorded, 
the recall phase of the trial began which differed by secondary task.  Below is the 
description for the secondary tasks utilized in this study. 
 The secondary tasks chosen for this experiment are a suite of tasks tested in the 
working memory literature to tease apart the unique functions of the central executive, 
phonological loop, and visuospatial sketchpad.  These specific dual task settings were 
chosen because of their similarity in procedure.  The central executive and phonological 
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loop secondary tasks were adapted from Fougnie and Marios (2007), and the visuospatial 
sketchpad secondary task was adapted from Fougnie and Marios (2009). 
 Phonological Loop and Central Executive.  The procedures for the central 
executive and phonological loop were the same, but each task required unique processing 
of the information presented.   In the initial phase of the task, participants saw a screen 
with the word “LISTEN” centered, at which point either four or six randomly spoken 
letters were presented aurally through headphones, at an interstimulus interval of 500ms.  
The letters presented were randomly selected from the following 10 letters: 
FGKNQPRSTX.  In the phonological loop setting, participants were told to simply 
commit the letters heard to memory in the order they were presented.  In the central 
executive setting, participants were told to commit the letters heard to memory after 
arranging them in alphabetical order.   
 After completion of the primary task, a retention period of 2500ms was followed 
by a single probe memory test.  On the screen were identical horizontal place-holders 
matching in number to the number of letters heard in the initial phase of the trial.  The 
memory probe was one of the memorized letters above one of the place-holders.  In the 
phonological loop setting, the participant decided if the probe’s position matched that of 
the order initially spoken in the beginning of the trial.  In the central executive setting, the 
participant decided if the position of the probe matched the correct position given the 
alphabetized arrangement of the letters heard.  The probe’s location was determined 
randomly on each trial and an equal number of match/no match trials were presented.  In 
the case of control trials, participants initially heard a series of the letter “Y” (series 
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lengths of four or six).  This trial acted as a control as the position of the letter in the 
probe phase was always correct.    
Visuospatial Sketchpad.  A similar procedure was used as described for the other 
secondary tasks, but instead of memorizing letters for later recall, the participant was 
asked to memorize displays of object arrays.  After the initial fixation slide, a display 
containing either four or six objects appeared for 500ms.  The array consisted of two sets 
of circles and triangles and each object was randomly filled with different colors such 
that no color was repeated in any one trial.  The colors of the circles were red, brown, 
blue, yellow, and purple.  The colors that filled the triangles were light blue, green, pink, 
orange, and white.  The participant was told to commit the locations of the colors to 
memory for later recall. 
 Following the primary task was a 1000ms single object cue (displaying either a 
black circle or triangle), a 1000ms retention period, followed by a memory test.  The cue 
screen indicated which set of objects the participant would recall within a single change 
detection procedure (Irwin, 1992; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Wheeler & 
Triesman, 2002).  That is, if the cue indicated a memory test for circles, then the task was 
to decide if the circle presented (in the specific position) matched in color to that of the 
original stimulus.  For example, the participant decided if a red circle appearing on the 
screen had appeared in that position in the initial display. 
 The arrangement of the objects was such that, in the six object display, circles 
were placed in the bottom corners of the display and above the fixation point, while 
triangles were placed in the upper corners of the display and below the fixation point.  In 
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the four object condition, circles were placed to the left and right of the fixation, while 
triangles were placed above and below the fixation point (Fougnie & Marios, 2009).  
Note that these structural configurations of the shapes did not change, however the color 
of these shapes did.  Thus, the behavior measured is the participant’s ability to detect a 
change in color at specific shape locations.  The cue presented was determined randomly 
on each trial and an equal number of match/no match trials were presented.  In control 
trials, the initial display and memory phase consisted of shapes that were all black.  Thus, 
the response phase should have always elicited a “match” response as the color of the 
objects was not subject to change. 
 Participants completed the informed consent and AMAS prior to the completion 
of the experimental trials.  The WRAT-3 was administered after the experimental tasks 
were completed.  Subsequently, participants were notified that their research credits were 
granted and were debriefed before leaving the laboratory.  The experimental task was 
administered using Eprime 2.0 experimental software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Each session lasted approximately 80 minutes.  
Results 
Analyses 
 The following results were drawn from the same mixed factor analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) design including numerical distance (distances 1-4), secondary task (central 
executive, phonological loop, VSSP), working memory load (zero, four, and six load), 
and math anxiety (low and high math anxious) as the independent variables.  Reaction 
times (RTs) and percent error analyses were computed independently, once for the 
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behavior recorded during the completion of the primary task (number comparison) and 
once for the behavior recorded during the secondary task (recall) phases of the trials. 
Primary Task Reaction Time 
 The results of the comparison analysis revealed that the main effect of numerical 
distance was significant, indicating the typical decline in RT as the distance between the 
numerical magnitudes of the presented digit and the standard increased, F (3,123) = 3.27, 
p < .05, ηp
2 
=.07.  Further, RT was slowest in the VSSP secondary task (M=1067ms), 
followed with increasing speed in the central executive (M=937ms) and phonological 
loop tasks (M=843ms) respectively, F (2, 82) = 34.37, p <.01, ηp
2 
= .46.  The main effect 
of memory load was also obtained, indicating that the additional working memory load of 
maintaining four (M=969ms) and six (M=977ms) items in memory resulted in 
significantly longer RTs than observed in the zero load trials (M=901ms), F (2, 82) = 
14.03, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .26.  Note that the four and six load conditions did not differ 
significantly.   
 Importantly, the two-way interaction between secondary task and load was 
significant [F (4,164) = 2.91, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .07], as was the three-way interaction 
including these factors and math anxiety, F (4,164) = 3.41, p < .01, ηp
2 
=.08.  Figure 1 
and Figure 2 illustrate the data from the two- and three-way interactions respectively.  
Figure 1 reflects the overall slower performance under VSSP load.  Surprisingly, this was 
even true of the zero load conditions.  Further, within each secondary task setting, the 
zero load conditions were significantly faster than the four load conditions.  Finally, the 
zero load conditions were significantly faster than the six load conditions within the 
central executive and VSSP settings but not in the phonological loop setting.   
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 As seen in Figure 2, the overall greater interference in the VSSP setting was 
observed for both anxiety groups; however the interference experienced was especially 
large for the high math anxious participants.  Post-hoc analyses indicated that the four 
and six load conditions were significantly slower for this group in comparison to the low 
anxious participants, and that these differences were the only ones to reach significance 
between the two anxiety groups.  Importantly, the three-way interaction remained 
significant after including math achievement scores as a covariate in the analysis, F (4, 
160) = 4.33, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .10. 
Primary Task Percent Error 
 Including percent error as the dependent measure resulted in a main effect of 
secondary task, F (2, 84) = 3.41, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .08; however, this effect may be spurious 
and of little meaning.  The post-hoc comparisons indicated that the overall percent error 
committed in the central executive task (M = 1%), phonological loop (M = 2.1%) and 
VSSP (M = .6%), did not statistically differ. 
 In a similar fashion, the numerical distance x math anxiety interaction was 
significant, F (3, 126) = 2.81, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .06.  The post-hoc comparisons for this effect 
revealed that the high and low math anxious participants did not differ at any numerical 
distance.  Further, the within group comparisons showed that the errors committed by the 
low math anxious did not vary as a function of numerical distance, while the high math 
anxious participants committed a significantly larger percent of error in comparisons of 
digits 1 away in magnitude (M = 1.8%) than comparisons of digits 3 away in magnitude 
(M = .4%).  Despite the correct direction of the high math anxious differences, the results 
are treated with caution, as it appears that all participants were at ceiling in terms of 
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accuracy in the comparison phase of the task (all cells’ percent error scores were less than 
5% error overall).  Moreover, both the main effect of secondary task and the interaction 
between distance and math anxiety were no longer significant after controlling for 
achievement scores [F < 1.0 for the main effect; F (3, 123) = 2.23, p > .05, for the 
interaction].  No interpretation is attempted for these effects, given the almost perfect 
performance recorded for all of the participants (see Risko, Maloney, & Fugelsang, 2013 
for similar results concerning the size congruity effect in magnitude comparison).   
 Taken together, the primary task results suggest that magnitude comparison 
within the H/L 5 task variant relies on resources employed by the central executive and 
visuospatial sketchpad; however, little evidence was found demonstrating the 
involvement of the phonological loop in comparison processing.  The associated 
impairments were reflected in RTs only.  Additionally, it appears that the math anxiety 
groups differentially relied on the two relevant working memory components; the low 
and high math anxious participants demonstrated equivalent dual-task interference in the 
central executive task whereas the high math anxious participants were especially 
affected by concurrent visuospatial processing in comparison to the low math anxious 
participants.  Finally, these math anxiety differences in RT do not seem to be associated 
with the mathematical achievement of the participants. 
Secondary Task Reaction Time 
 The equivalent analysis including the RTs from the recall phase revealed that the 
central executive (M=2147ms), phonological loop (M=1233ms), and VSSP (M=941ms) 
processing times were significantly different from each other, F (2, 82) = 133.46, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .77.  Additionally, the main effect of memory load revealed that the zero load (M = 
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765ms), four load (M = 1664ms), and six load (M = 1893ms) conditions also differed 
significantly, F (2, 82) = 254.85, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .86. 
 Finally the load x secondary task interaction was significant (see Figure 3), F (4, 
164) = 94.25, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .70.  The post-hoc analyses for this effect showed that the 
zero load trials did not differ between secondary tasks, although the four and six load 
conditions did.  Further, the RTs of each load were significantly different from each other 
within each secondary task.  As seen in the figure, it is clear that additional processing 
slowed responding most in the central executive secondary task followed by the 
phonological loop.  Importantly, no effects of math anxiety were obtained. 
Secondary Task Percent Error 
 The percent error analysis revealed that a larger percent error was committed 
overall in the central executive (M = 20.4%) and VSSP (M = 22.0%) secondary tasks as 
compared to the phonological loop task (M = 12.7%), F (2, 84) = 20.34, p < .01, ηp
2 
= 
.33.  Also, the main effect of memory load was significant, F (2, 84) = 345.82, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .89.  The percent error committed was significantly different between all three 
levels, with 30.5% error in the six load trials, 21.6% error in the four load conditions, and 
3% error in the zero load trials. 
 Finally, the secondary task x load interaction was obtained (see Figure 4), F (4, 
168) = 12.83, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .23.  The figure shows that percent error was lowest in the 
phonological loop dual task setting and that percent error of the VSSP and central 
executive settings were equivalent in the four and six load conditions.  Also shown is an 
increase in percent error with each addition of memory load in the phonological loop and 
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VSSP, while percent error in the central executive setting did not significantly differ from 
four to six load conditions.  Interestingly, the between task comparisons by memory load 
revealed that the percent error in the zero load VSSP secondary task (M = 7.1%) was 
significantly larger than the percents recorded in the central executive (M = 1.0%) and 
phonological loop (M = 0.9%) secondary tasks.   
  Taken together, the results discussed so far lead to the possibility that, although 
not substantially working memory demanding, number comparison processes were 
differentially affected by the dual task settings administered.  That is, both the central 
executive and visuospatial sketchpad were implicated in poorer comparison performance 
as compared to the phonological loop.  Importantly, the worse performance in the VSSP 
task seemed to be due to impaired efficiency of the high math anxious participants 
specifically.  The secondary task results indicate that memory recall was most difficult in 
the central executive setting, and least difficult in the phonological loop.  Importantly, 
interactions including neither numerical distance nor math anxiety factors were obtained 
in the secondary task results, suggesting that the effects reported reflect the difficulty of 
the secondary tasks independent from the primary task.   
 One problem with the interpretation of the primary task results is that the RTs 
recorded varied across working memory load within their own time-scales; interpreting 
such results is difficult given the difference in absolute RT between each secondary task 
setting.  To examine the relative interference associated with additional memory load 
within each secondary task, dual-task cost (DTC) scores were computed on the RTs for 
each participant’s performance separately for the primary and secondary tasks.  That is, a 
DTC score was computed for each distance presented within the levels of load of each 
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dual-task setting per participant.  The costs are calculated by taking the difference 
between the zero load condition RT (control condition) and the RT associated with the 
four and six load conditions independently (experimental conditions).  That difference is 
then divided by the zero load condition RT and multiplied by 100.  The cost scores 
represent a percentage of change from the baseline RT of the zero trials to the respective 
experimental trial condition (four or six load).   
In the present study, the results of a DTC analysis allow for interpretations related 
to the exact nature of working memory employment during magnitude comparison 
(comparing the three dual-task settings to each other), as well as the nature of the 
interference that is most strongly associated with varying levels of math anxiety (being 
able to examine the absolute differences in impairment between high and low math 
anxious individuals).  These interpretations are allowed due to the fact that the dual-task 
cost formula creates scores across the tasks and groups that are of a similar metric in 
percent change between zero load trials and those of additional load.    
Primary Task DTC Analysis 
 Dual-task cost scores were input as the dependent measure in a 4 (distances 1-4) x 
3 (central executive, phonological loop, VSSP) x 2 (four and six working memory load) x 
2 (low and high math anxiety) ANOVA.  Note that a more negative value indicates larger 
impairment because additional load resulted in larger RTs compared to the zero load 
trials.  Stated another way, more negative DTC scores indicate greater decreases in 
processing efficiency.   
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 The results of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 5.  First, note the strong cost 
associated with the central executive setting.  The impairment associated with this setting 
was significantly different from both the costs associated with VSSP and phonological 
loop, F (2, 82) = 6.0, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .13.  The latter two did not differ from each other.  
Importantly, the math anxiety x secondary task interaction was also obtained, F (2, 82) = 
5.16, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .11.  The post-hoc analyses revealed that only the VSSP dual-task 
setting was found to incur differential costs between the math anxiety groups.  Further, 
comparisons within the math anxiety groups revealed that the low math anxious 
participants demonstrated more cost in the central executive secondary task than in the 
other two settings.  By contrast, the high math anxiety group only showed significant cost 
differences between the phonological loop and VSSP secondary tasks.  Including 
achievement as a covariate did not eliminate the secondary task x math anxiety 
interaction, F (2, 80) = 6.52, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .14. 
Secondary Task DTC Analysis 
 When considering the costs associated with the secondary task performance, the 
main effects of secondary task [F (2, 84) = 91.65, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .69] and memory load 
were obtained, F (1, 42) = 42.57, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .50.  The interaction of these two factors 
was also significant and is illustrated in Figure 6, F (2, 84) = 6.36, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .13. 
 The figure clearly shows the two main effects: the central executive secondary 
task led to the greatest cost, followed by the phonological loop and VSSP tasks 
respectively.  Further, the six-load trials led to more processing impairment than did the 
four-load trials.  The interaction reflects that the discrepancy between the two memory 
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load conditions was more substantial in the central executive and phonological loop tasks 
than in the VSSP task. 
 Note that the lack of math anxiety effects in the secondary task results support the 
idea that differences in dual-task performance between the high and low math anxious 
cannot be immediately attributed to overall differences in working memory capacity.  
That is, if the high math anxious did have lower overall working memory capacities, then 
the dual task cost analysis for recall performance would be expected to reveal a working 
memory load x math anxiety interaction, whereby the high math anxious would be 
associated with higher costs with increased memory load as compared to the low math 
anxious.  This possibility was not confirmed in the present results, however. 
 The DTC analyses showed that comparison efficiency was impaired with 
additional central executive load for both groups, but also that the high math anxious in 
the sample exhibited impaired performance in the VSSP dual task setting.  Importantly, 
the high and low math anxious group differences in the VSSP dual-task setting were only 
found in the primary task performance; no math anxiety group differences were obtained 
in the recall portion of the task.  Because primary task completion was not found to 
influence performance in the secondary task, it appears possible that the high math 
anxiety group may have faced impairment in a process unrelated to the effective 
maintenance of visual information.   
Experiment 1 Discussion 
 In sum, it appears that comparison processes (at least in the H/L 5 task variant) 
require central executive processing.  Future studies need to examine this conclusion in 
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the context of comparison of simultaneously presented digits, as the central executive 
demands demonstrated here may simply be related to the repeated retrieval of the 
standard magnitude needed for each trial (see Maloney, Risko, Preston, Ansari, & 
Fugelsang, 2010).  Interestingly, however, the reliance on this component was not related 
to the numerical distance of each comparison completed.  That is, additional working 
memory load did not influence the numerical distance effect, nor did the numerical 
distance of comparisons influence the performance within the secondary task. 
 One potential explanation for not finding differences in numerical distance effects 
as a function of math anxiety (as found in Maloney et al., 2011) could simply be that the 
variance associated with the dual-task paradigm may have overwhelmed the variance of 
the distance effects.  Additionally, note that the sample tested by Maloney and colleagues 
was comprised of high and low math anxious individuals that were drawn from extreme 
ends of the distribution, while this study employed a median split procedure.  Because of 
these differences between reports, future studies should attempt to replicate these effects 
in new samples.  In the present study, however, the lack of differences in numerical 
distance suggests that the math anxiety differences are not related to the representation of 
numerical magnitude. 
Importantly, the performance within the central executive task did not reveal math 
anxiety group differences.  Instead, dual-task cost analyses suggest that group differences 
were observed only in concurrent VSSP dual-task demands; the high math anxious 
participants exhibited more cost than the low math anxious participants.  The inclusion of 
the math achievement covariate did not account for this interaction.  A potential 
explanation for this result is that the high math anxious individuals may suffer from 
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visual working memory deficits, which could be used as support for conventional 
understandings of the mathematics anxiety construct.  To the contrary, however, this 
same math anxiety deficit was not observed in the secondary task phase of the experiment 
or with the increase from a four to six working memory load.  This is an important point 
because working memory deficits within a specific component should be present in the 
situations that are most difficult in a task, as is shown in numerous math anxiety 
investigations testing arithmetic performance (e.g., Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Mattarella-
Micke et al., 2011). 
 The explanation considered here is focused on attentional resource efficiency 
related to the presence of high levels of mathematics anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Critically, Eysenck and colleagues assert that the experience of anxiety during cognitive 
processing results in a shift away from goal-directed attentional systems in favor of 
stimulus-driven systems (i.e., Corbetta & Schulman, 2002), causing impaired 
performance in cognitive tasks relying on central executive resources.  Recent work has 
shown that attentional processing is important for numerical magnitude comparison, and 
that factors affecting the allocation of attention to the task can alter comparison 
performance (Goldfarb & Tzelgov, 2005; see also Risko, Maloney, and Fugelsang, 2013).  
The full reasoning for this explanation will be provided in the General Discussion of this 
paper.  To follow is an explanation of Experiment 2, which investigated math anxiety, 
math achievement, and working memory demands in a simple enumeration task. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 Experiment 2 examines the association between mathematics anxiety and simple 
enumeration processes.  Enumeration processes have been well studied in the field of 
mathematical cognition and visual attention (Ansari, Lyons, van Eimeren, & Xu, 2007; 
Balakrishnan & Ashby, 1992; Feigenson & Carey, 2005; Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & 
Volkman, 1949; Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Pagano, Lombardi, & Mazza, 2014; Trick & 
Pylyshyn, 1994).  Of interest to the present investigation are results demonstrating less 
efficient enumeration of set sizes that require explicit counting procedures in individuals 
who are highly math anxious as compared to their low math anxious peers (Maloney et 
al., 2010).  Importantly, these math anxiety differences were not observed in set sizes that 
are thought to require little (if any) working memory assistance.  Before describing the 
conclusions offered by the authors, a brief description of the enumeration task and 
published interpretations are provided. 
 Enumeration is a process of updating a serial count of objects until the total of a 
collective set is known.  There is a large and long-lasting debate in the literature 
regarding the mechanisms underlying these processes (Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & 
Gelman, 1992; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Wynn, 1992; 1995).  The reason for this debate 
is centered on the well-researched construct of subitizing (Kaufman et al., 1949), or the 
rapid and accurate appreciation of the total enumerated in set sizes around 3 or 4 items in 
total.  Beyond this range, explicit and more effortful counting procedures are needed to 
arrive at the set’s total.  The principle debate surrounding these characteristics is whether 
one or more enumeration mechanisms exist to accommodate the two ranges.  Although 
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the present experiment is not designed to make a determination regarding this debate, the 
ranges will be treated (at least qualitatively) as originating from two separate 
mechanisms, as suggested by the results of Maloney et al. (2010), which will be 
described shortly (see also Vuokko, Niemivirta, & Helenius, 2013).  For the sake of 
clarity, enumeration in the present study will refer to the processes involved with 
identifying the total of set sizes (regardless of the actual size of that set), subitizing will 
refer to the enumeration of set sizes specifically in the range of 1-3 objects in total, and 
counting will refer to enumeration of set sizes larger than 3 in total. 
 The two processes described here tend to elicit drastically different performance 
profiles.  The subitizing range often elicits RT profiles that are fast and vary little as a 
function of set size.  That is, the RTs associated with the identification of the totals of set 
sizes in the range of 1-3 or 4 form a rather shallow slope with regard to increases in set 
size, and are characterized by relatively fast absolute RTs.  By contrast, RTs in the 
counting range form a consistently increasing positive slope with each increase in set 
size.  These profiles are found across the life-span (Chi & Klahr, 1975; Starkey & 
Cooper, 1995), and serve as a cornerstone set of phenomena in the math cognition 
literature.   
 These classic enumeration patterns are of interest in the present study due to a 
recent report implicating math anxiety as a factor that modulates the efficiency with 
which set sizes are enumerated.  More specifically, Maloney and colleagues found a 
significant interaction between the number of items to be enumerated and math anxiety; 
high math anxious participants were found to have slower counting than the low math 
anxious, but RTs between the groups were similar in the subitizing range.  The authors 
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drew two possible conclusions regarding their results.  The first was that this pattern of 
behavior supported the conventional math anxiety construct, with high math anxious 
individuals experiencing interference in the more working memory dependent counting 
range, but not in the relatively resource independent subitizing range.  Importantly, the 
authors’ conclusions also appealed to the notion that poorer counting skills may be 
related to deficient mathematical competency in the high math anxious individuals.  To 
examine these trends further, the same method from Experiment 1 was employed here, 
but with enumeration serving as the primary task.  The goals of Experiment 2 were to 
examine both the working memory deficit and mathematical achievement hypotheses 
under dual task settings.  As in Experiment 1, math anxiety self-report and mathematical 
achievement scores of the participants were recorded to examine the relationships 
between both constructs and performance in an enumeration task. 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 58 participants (37 females) were recruited for this experiment.  The 
mean age of the sample was 20.3 years old.  As in Experiment 1, course relevant research 
credits were granted in exchange for participation. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 2 is identical to that of Experiment 1 with the 
exception of the primary task.  The enumeration task administered here consisted of trials 
in which participants viewed a screen with black squares (ranging from 1 to 8 in total) 
displayed on a white background.  Upon stimulus onset, the goal of the participant was to 
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count the number of squares as quickly and accurately as possible.  Once the set size was 
known, the participant was instructed to speak the total into the microphone which acted 
as a voice key to stop recording the RT of the trial.  Experimenters manually recorded the 
spoken response of the participants into a research journal.  The set sizes were sampled 
12 times each per block, yielding 96 trials per block.  Each presentation of set size was a 
unique stimulus with pseudorandom arrangement of the squares controlling for 
stereotypical configurations of quantity (i.e. dice patterns).  The experimental task was 
administered using Eprime 2.0 experimental software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Each session lasted approximately 80 minutes.  
Results 
Analyses 
 The data recorded in Experiment 2 were input into ANOVAs designed with set 
size (1-8 in total), secondary task (phonological loop, central executive, and VSSP), 
working memory load (zero, four, and six loads), and math anxiety (high and low math 
anxiety) as the independent factors.  Math anxiety was the only between-subjects factor.  
In the case of significant math anxiety effects, the analysis was re-visited with 
mathematical achievement input as a possible covariate.  Dependent variables were the 
RTs and percent error within the primary and secondary tasks separately. 
Primary Task Reaction Time 
 The ANOVA results showed that counting was slowest overall in the VSSP 
secondary-task condition (M = 1469ms), which was significantly slower than the RTs 
recorded in the central executive (M = 1380ms) and phonological loop dual-task setting 
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(M = 1352ms), F (2, 80) = 11.58, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .23.  The RTs of the latter two settings 
did not differ statistically from each other.  Further, RTs were significantly slower in the 
four load (M = 1410ms) and six load conditions (M = 1451ms) as compared to the zero 
load conditions (M = 1339ms), F (2, 80) = 18.25, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .31. 
 Importantly, the typical subitizing effect was obtained, F (7, 280) = 338.36, p < 
.01, ηp
2 
= .89.  The main effect of set size shows a shallow slope and relatively fast 
absolute RTs in the enumeration of the first 3 sets of objects, and a steeper slope with 
progressively slower absolute RTs as set size increased.  As found in the literature, the set 
size x math anxiety interaction was obtained [F (7, 280) = 3.48, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .08], and 
this effect was augmented with the inclusion of secondary task, F (14, 560) = 2.93, p < 
.01, ηp
2 
= .07.  Figure 7 illustrates this three-way effect.  The figure shows that the math 
anxiety x set size interaction can be described as growing discrepancy in the RTs of high 
and low math anxious individuals as the set size of the enumerated displays increased, 
and that this discrepancy is driven by slower RTs exhibited by the high math anxious 
individuals.  This effect replicates the math anxiety effect found in Maloney et al. (2010).  
The contribution of the secondary task factor in the three-way interaction reveals two 
important patterns.  First, it appears that the high math anxious experienced more 
interference due to concurrent VSSP processing than did the low math anxious 
participants.  Second, note that the separation between the math anxiety groups begins 
earlier in the count sequence (with smaller set sizes) when the participants were under 
concurrent VSSP task demands.  These patterns will be further explored later in the 
results. 
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 The secondary task x memory load interaction was significant, and shows that the 
zero load trials of the VSSP task were significantly slower than the other two dual-task 
settings, as were the RTs associated with the six-load trials, F (4, 160) = 2.53, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .06.  The four load trials were only different between the VSSP task and the 
phonological loop task.  As for the within task comparisons across memory load, the 
post-hoc comparisons revealed that the zero load trials were significantly slower than the 
four and six load trials (the four and six load conditions did not differ significantly).  In 
the phonological loop task, only the zero and six load conditions differed.  Finally, the 
VSSP zero load trials were significantly faster than the four and six load conditions, 
while the four and six load conditions were only marginally different (p = .08). 
 The working memory load x set size interaction was also obtained, F (14, 560) = 
3.45, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .08.  From Figure 8, it appears that the zero load trials resulted in 
faster enumeration along with entire continuum.  Within the range of smaller set sizes (1-
3 in total), it appears that any additional load was associated with larger RTs, whereas 
only the six load conditions seemed to appreciably increase RTs in the counting range, 
but only in set sizes larger than 5 in total.  To examine these patterns in greater detail, the 
subitizing and counting ranges were examined independent of each other.   
Primary Task Reaction Time: Subitizing Range 
 The equivalent analysis including only set sizes ranging from 1 to 3 in total was 
conducted to examine the influence of secondary task, working memory load, and 
mathematics anxiety on enumeration RTs.  The results indicate that secondary task did 
influence performance, revealing that RTs were slowest under concurrent VSSP load 
(M=975ms) as compared to the central executive (M = 883ms) and phonological loop (M 
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= 842ms) working memory loads, F (2, 80) = 12.11, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .23.  The VSSP task 
elicited significantly longer RTs than the other two secondary tasks, which did not differ 
from each other.  Further, although not different from each other, the four and six load 
conditions (Ms = 936ms and 925ms respectively) were significantly slower than the zero 
load conditions (M = 838ms), F (2, 80) = 10.20, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .20.  Interestingly, the 
main effect of set size was significant, F (2, 80) = 7.62, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .16.  Upon further 
inspection, however, it appears that the difference in RTs may simply reflect the 
characteristics of recording voice key activation.  That is, the means show significantly 
faster responses to the set size of 2 (M = 862ms) than 1 (M = 916ms) or 3 (M = 921ms).  
These results are thought to reflect the more prominent initial phoneme of the number 
word “two” than the other two set sizes in the this analysis (Rastle & Davis, 2002).  No 
other effects were obtained in this analysis. 
Primary Task Reaction Time: Counting Range 
 The main effect of secondary task within the counting range mirrored that of the 
subitizing range, F (2, 80) = 7.16, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .15.  That is, the VSSP secondary task (M 
= 1765ms) elicited significantly longer RTs than both the central executive (M = 
1678ms) and phonological loop (M = 1659ms).  Additionally, the RTs associated with six 
(M = 1767ms), four (M = 1695ms), and zero load conditions (M = 1640ms) were all 
significantly different from each other [F (2, 80) = 15.67, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .28], and RTs 
increased as set size increased, F (4, 160) = 227.98, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .85. 
 Figure 9 illustrates the significant working memory load x set size interaction, F 
(8, 320) = 3.86, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .09.  The figure shows that responses were slower as both 
set size and working memory load increased.  Interestingly, it can be seen that the 
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separation of RTs between memory loads did not become apparent until a set size of six 
items, and then persists throughout the rest of the enumeration continuum. 
 Importantly, the main effect of math anxiety was obtained [F (1, 40) = 4.48, p < 
.05, ηp
2 
= .10], and contributed to a three-way interaction also including secondary task 
and set size, F (8, 320) = 3.72, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .09.  Figure 10 illustrates the interaction, 
paneled by math anxiety group.  First note the main effect of math anxiety, whereby the 
high math anxious were routinely slower in enumeration (M = 1809ms) than were the 
low math anxious individuals (M = 1592ms).  Also, it appears that the high math anxious 
participants experienced much greater impairment due to concurrent VSSP processing 
along the entire continuum than the low anxious participants did.  Importantly, including 
math achievement as a covariate resulted in the elimination of these two math anxiety 
effects [F < 1.0 for the main effect and F (8, 312) = 1.07 for the interaction, both ps > 
1.0].  The contribution of math achievement will be addressed in the general discussion. 
Primary Task Percent Error 
 The 3 (secondary task) x 3 (memory load) x 8 (number) x 2 (math anxiety) 
ANOVA with percent error as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of number 
such that percent error increased as the number of total objects counted increased, F (7, 
280) = 15.54, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .28.  The post-hoc comparisons showed that, interestingly, the 
increase in error began at 6 objects (M = 6.3%) and was maintained through 7 (M = 
5.4%) and 8 objects (M = 6.3%). All mean percents of set sizes below 6 elicited very few 
errors overall (all cell means < 1% error).  Also significant was the number x load 
interaction, which shows the general trend of percent error after set sizes 5 in total 
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growing more quickly specifically in the presence of a six item memory load.  No other 
effects were obtained. 
Primary Task Percent Error: Subitizing Range 
 The only effect to reach significance in the analysis including only the subitizing 
range of objects was the secondary task x math anxiety interaction, F (2, 80) = 3.39, p < 
.05, ηp
2 
= .08.  Upon further inspection, however, it was determined that this effect is 
most likely spurious, given that all cells’ values indicated performance that was at 
ceiling.  To be sure, the largest mean percent error was 0.7% error, followed by a mean 
percent error of 0.4%.  Beyond these two cells, the means were 0.1% or smaller.  
Moreover, the inclusion of the math achievement covariate eliminated the interaction, F 
(2, 78) = 1.95, p > .10.  Given these effects, the trends will not be discussed further. 
Primary Task Percent Error: Counting Range 
 As with the analysis including all set sizes, the counting range analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of number [F (4, 160) = 11.54, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .22] and a significant 
number x load interaction, F (8, 320) = 2.31, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .06.  The same interpretations 
offered for the overall analysis hold for these results as well, and need not be discussed 
further. 
 The results from the primary task analyses revealed that, overall, additional 
processing of visuospatial information interfered most with enumeration performance.  
Furthermore, this effect was most prominent within the high math anxious participants, 
although mathematical achievement appears to mediate this characteristic of the data.  
Interestingly, performance in the subitizing range revealed that any amount of additional 
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load led to equivalent impairment in enumeration, while the impairment observed in the 
counting range increased with each additional increase in working memory load.  Finally 
it is important to note that observed impairments were most prominent in the extreme 
ends of the enumeration continuum (subitizing range and counting set sizes of 6 or 
greater). 
Secondary Task Reaction Time 
 The RTs recorded within the information recall phase of the trials varied by the 
secondary task tested [F (2, 80) = 85.60, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .68] and by the working memory 
load encountered, F (2, 80) = 256.80, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .87.  Further, the interaction of these 
factors is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows relatively small RT differences between 
the dual-task settings in the zero-load conditions, and with increasing differences between 
the secondary tasks as memory load increased.  More specifically, it can be seen that 
additional working memory load resulted in the slowest RTs in the central executive dual 
task setting, followed by the phonological loop and VSSP, respectively. 
 Additionally, the RTs associated with recall increased as the set size enumerated 
increased [F (7, 280) = 3.41, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .08], and this pattern varied as a function of 
working memory load, F (14, 560) = 2.86, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .07 (See Figure 12).  The most 
apparent trend of the figure shows a rather large separation in RTs between the zero load 
condition and the trials associated with additional load.  Within each load condition, the 
effect of set size varied as well, with only a minor increase in RT with increasing set size 
in the zero load condition, a slightly larger increase in the four load condition, and the 
largest increase in the six-load condition.  Note also the much more variable RTs in the 
six load condition than the other two loads.   
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 Finally, the analysis revealed a four-way interaction including all of the factors of 
the ANOVA design, F (28, 1120) = 1.96, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .05.  Before attempting to explain 
this effect, however, the two enumeration ranges are considered separately for analysis. 
Secondary Task Reaction Time: Subitizing Range 
 The analysis considering secondary task performance associated with the 
enumeration of set sizes in the subitizing range showed that responses were slowest under 
central executive load (M = 1911ms) which was significantly slower than those RTs in 
the phonological loop (M = 1335ms), which were in turn slower than the RTs in the 
VSSP setting (M = 991ms), F (2, 80) = 70.79, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .64.  Also, RTs increased as 
memory load increased, F (2, 80) = 174.75, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .81.  The six (M = 1783ms), 
four (M = 1609ms), and zero load conditions (M = 844ms) were all significantly 
different.  Finally, the secondary task x working memory load interaction was significant 
and consistent with the pattern observed in the omnibus test; the four and six load 
conditions were associated with the largest RTs within the central executive dual task 
setting, followed by the phonological loop and VSSP settings respectively, F ( 4, 160) = 
49.79, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .56. 
Secondary Task Reaction Time: Counting Range 
 Recall RTs associated with counting range trials were largest in the central 
executive secondary task (M = 1885ms), and were faster in the phonological loop (M = 
1322ms) and VSSP (M = 1122ms) secondary tasks respectively, F (2, 80) = 75.81, p < 
.01, ηp
2 
= .66.  As described already, the six load trials (M = 1782ms), four load trials (M 
= 1661ms), and zero load trials (M = 887ms) were all significantly different from each 
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other, F (2, 80) = 210.62, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .84.  Also, the time taken to respond in the recall 
phase increased as the number of items counted increased, F (4, 160) = 5.65, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .12. 
 Interestingly, the secondary task x working memory load x set size interaction 
was obtained, and is presented in Figure 13, F (16, 640) = 2.10, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .05.  The 
patterns across the secondary tasks shows that the differences between additional load 
trials and the zero load trials is largest in the central executive dual-task setting, and that 
this difference is reduced in the phonological loop and VSSP tasks respectively.  Further, 
the influence of set size reflects the steeper slope in the four and six load conditions as 
compared to the zero load condition.  These patterns were supported by the secondary 
task x working memory load interaction [F (4, 160) = 74.83, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .65] as well as 
the working memory load x set size interaction, F (8, 320) = 4.10, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .09. 
 Finally, the four- way interaction including all of the design’s factors was 
obtained [F (16, 640) = 2.35, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .06], and was supported by the three-way 
interaction already described as well as the secondary task x number x math anxiety 
interaction, F (8, 320) = 2.42, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .06.  Importantly, with math achievement as a 
covariate in the follow-up analysis, the secondary task x working memory load x set size 
interaction, as well as the other supporting interaction of secondary task, set size, and 
math anxiety were eliminated (ps > .10).  Although the four-way interaction remained 
significant after controlling for math achievement scores [F (16, 624) = 1.93, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .05], its interpretation is not attempted given the loss of supporting effects and strong 
likelihood that the effect is spurious in the present data.  
  56 
Secondary Task Percent Error 
 With the percent error of responses input as the dependent measure, the ANOVA 
results revealed the significant main effects of secondary task [F (2, 80) = 22.60, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .36], working memory load [F(2, 80) = 161.63, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .80], as well as their 
interaction, F (4, 160) = 12.30, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .24.  The main effect of secondary task 
showed that the percent error of responses within the central executive (M = 24%) and 
VSSP (M = 26%) were significantly larger than compared to the percent recorded within 
the phonological loop (M = 15%), although the former two did not differ from each other.  
The effect of memory load revealed that the percent error in the six load trials (M = 33%) 
was significantly larger than that within the four load trials (M = 25%), which, in turn, 
was larger than the percent error in the zero load trials (M = 7%).  Figure 14 illustrates 
the secondary task x working memory load interaction and reveals that, in general, the 
percent error within the phonological loop was lowest regardless of load.  Further, the 
VSSP tended to elicit larger percents of error across all memory loads, and even elicited 
significantly more error in the zero load trials than either of the other two secondary 
tasks.  Also, secondary task means differed in the four load conditions, while only the 
VSSP and phonological loop dual-task settings differed in the six load conditions. 
 The analysis also indicated that the number of objects counted influenced the 
percent error in the secondary task such that percent error in recall increased as the set 
size counted just previous to this phase of the trial increased, F (7, 280) = 3.85, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .09.  Importantly, the main effect of math anxiety was obtained such that the high 
math anxious committed a larger percentage of error overall (M = 24%) than did the low 
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math anxious participants (M = 20%), and will be re-evaluated further in the results, F (1, 
40) = 4.58, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .10.   
Secondary Task Percent Error: Subitizing Range 
 The analysis of the subitizing range indicated that the percent error in recall 
within the central executive (M = 23%) and VSSP (M = 22%) were significantly larger 
than in the phonological loop (M = 15%), F (2, 80) = 8.56, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .18.  Further, the 
main effect of memory load was obtained, revealing that the six load trials (M = 32%), 
four load trials (M = 23%), and zero load trials (M = 5.8%) all significantly differed, F 
(2, 80) = 103.93, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .72.  Finally, the interaction between these factors was 
obtained, and largely reflects the patterns described for the full analysis, F (4, 160) = 
5.24, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .12. 
Secondary Task Percent Error: Counting Range 
 The analysis including the data associated with the counting range confirmed that 
the results obtained in the full analysis were the products of behavior within the counting 
range of set sizes.  That is, the main effects of secondary task [F (2, 80) = 22.51, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .36], memory load [F (2, 80) = 116.76, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .75], set size [F (4, 160) = 
3.95, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .09], and math anxiety [F (1, 40) = 5.73, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .13] were 
obtained.  Further, the secondary task x memory load interaction was obtained and was 
consistent with the description provided for the full analysis, F (4, 160) = 9.91, p < .01, 
ηp
2 
= .20.  Including the covariate of math achievement in the analysis eliminated the 
main effect of math anxiety, F (1, 39) = 1.07, p > .10.  
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 The results obtained in the secondary task portion of the experiment largely 
mirrored those obtained in Experiment 1.  That is, the effects are indicative of secondary 
task difficulty as opposed to interference caused by the primary task.  To be sure, the 
central executive setting appeared to be most difficult overall, while the phonological 
loop appeared to be the least difficult.  Importantly, as observed in Experiment 1, 
participants appeared to exhibit a speed/accuracy trade off in secondary task performance 
when confronted with the VSSP secondary task setting. 
 Unlike the results from Experiment 1, the secondary task results did seem to be 
influenced by the demands of the primary task.  That is, both the RT and error data 
reflected more difficult processing overall in the secondary task phase as the number of 
objects in the enumerated set sizes increased.  With regard to RT, the effect of set size 
seems to reflect differences between the relatively shallow slope of the zero load 
conditions as compared to the four and six load conditions. Most importantly, the main 
effect of math anxiety in the percent error results was found to be mediated by the math 
achievement of the individuals. 
Primary Task DTC Analysis 
 Because the results of Experiment 2 revealed that the subitizing and counting 
ranges of the enumeration largely differed in their susceptibility to interference within the 
task, dual task cost analyses were computed in an ANOVA evaluating the factors of 
secondary task (3 levels), working memory load (2 levels), math anxiety (2 levels), and 
enumeration range (2 levels: subitizing and counting range).  The range factor was 
employed here to examine the relative costs incurred within each range, without the 
difficulty of interpreting differences between the set sizes enumerated.   
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 The analysis showed a significant main effect of range [F (1, 38) = 4.69, p < .05, 
ηp
2 
= .11] and a significant range x load interaction, F (1, 38) = 9.16, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .19.  
The main effect reveals that the largest DTC scores were incurred in the subitizing range 
(M = -10.57%) as compared to the counting range (M = -5.46%).  The interaction shows 
that the costs incurred within the subitizing range did not differ based on the memory 
load of each trial, but that load did influence the costs within the counting range.  The 
four load conditions resulted in significantly less cost (M = -2.79%) than did the six load 
condition (M = -8.13%).  No other effects were significant in the comparison phase dual 
task cost analyses. 
Secondary Task DTC Analysis 
 The equivalent DTC analysis for the secondary task RTs indicated that the costs 
was greatest overall in the central executive (M = -216.66%), with less cost in the 
phonological loop (M = -117.0%), and VSSP (M = -23.58%) respectively, F (2, 76) = 
72.52, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .66.  Also, the six load conditions led to a greater cost to efficiency 
(M = -127.29%) than did the four load conditions (M = -110.87%), F (1, 38) = 19.56, p < 
.01, ηp
2 
= .34.  Finally, these two factors interacted, and the effect is illustrated in Figure 
15, F (2, 76) = 17.30, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .31.  The post-hoc analyses for this effect revealed 
that the four and six load costs were different between the three secondary tasks.  Further, 
the comparisons revealed that the six load costs were significantly greater than the four 
load costs for the VSSP and phonological loop tasks, but were not different within the 
central executive dual task setting. 
 The dual task costs analyses are interesting because neither the primary nor 
secondary task results indicated significant differences between the math anxiety groups.  
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This may not be expected, as participants with higher levels of mathematics anxiety are 
assumed to perform less efficiently in conditions that demand substantial working 
memory involvement.  Given the results of Maloney et al. (2010) and the working 
memory literature indicating that both central executive and phonological loop resources 
are utilized in counting procedures within arithmetic strategy completion (Hecht, 2002; 
see also Camos & Barrouillet, 2004), the typical high math anxious disadvantage would 
have been expected to be revealed in the high working memory load conditions.  Recall, 
however, that the influence of working memory load had minimal effects within the 
enumeration range, and that the primary interference experienced originated from 
additional visuospatial processing as opposed to loading the central executive.   
Experiment 2 Discussion 
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the mental processing employed in a 
simple enumeration task, and to examine the possibilities that individual differences in 
mathematics anxiety and mathematical achievement would be associated with moderated 
task performance.  To this end, participants completed an enumeration task in the context 
of three separate dual task settings, each tapping into one of the working memory 
components described by Baddeley and colleagues (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley 
& Logie, 1999).  The goals of the experiment were to replicate the high math anxious 
disadvantage as reported by Maloney and colleagues (Maloney et al., 2010), to examine 
the specific type of cognitive processing utilized in enumeration, and to test the 
possibility that the math achievement of participants would be associated with task 
performance. 
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With regard to the first goal, Experiment 2 did replicate the math anxiety 
differences reported in Maloney et al., (2010).  More specifically, it was found that those 
participants who reported higher levels of math anxiety were slower to enumerate within 
the counting range of set sizes than were the self-reported low math anxious.  As found in 
the literature, this difference was not obtained in the subitizing range of set sizes. 
Further, it was found that enumeration mechanisms were predominately reliant on 
visuospatial processing; enumeration performance was most impaired in the presence of 
concurrent visuospatial working memory load.  These results were not surprising, as the 
extant literature is in large agreement that visual processing is essential to both the 
subitizing and counting ranges (Ansari, Lyons, van Eimeren, & Xu, 2007; Vuokko et al., 
2013).  By contrast, a couple of the enumeration results were surprising.  First, the DTC 
analyses within the primary task revealed that additional cognitive load was related more 
strongly to the subitizing range as opposed to the counting range, which is 
counterintuitive based on the belief that the counting range is the more working memory 
demanding (e.g., Maloney et al., 2010). Finally, the results from Experiment 2 revealed 
that mathematical achievement was associated with performance in the enumeration task.  
Indeed, the use of math achievement scores as a covariate eliminated the mathematics 
anxiety group differences obtained.  This achievement mediation indicates that some 
characteristic of low achieving individuals was related to enumeration above and beyond 
that of math anxiety.  The explanation offered for this involvement will be outlined in the 
following section of this work. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationships between 
mathematics anxiety, mathematical achievement, and working memory function in the 
contexts of simple numerical magnitude comparison (Experiment 1) and enumeration 
(Experiment 2).  More specifically, the present investigation sought to explore the 
surprising results reported by Maloney and colleagues which showed that mathematics 
anxiety was associated with a steeper numerical distance effect in comparison (Maloney 
et al., 2011) and steeper counting functions in enumeration (Maloney et al., 2010).  These 
results are surprising because they fall outside the conventional purview of the 
mathematics anxiety construct which describes that math anxiety disrupts crucial working 
memory function needed to complete the most mentally taxing aspects of a task.  The 
point of contention with respect to the conventional theory is that number comparison 
and enumeration processes are presumed to proceed with little need for working memory 
assistance.  Thus, alternative explanations were considered for the individual difference 
effects observed.  Here, I review the results found in the present investigation, and 
explain their relationships with the theory guiding the development of the math anxiety 
construct (the Processing Efficiency Theory, Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), and how 
important extensions of this theory are believed to relate to the results obtained (i.e., 
Eysenck et al., 2007).   
 The results from the present study can be described as follows.  First, the primary 
task results provide evidence that the dual task settings differentially influenced 
performance in number comparison and enumeration.  The setting most disruptive to 
  63 
comparison processes was the central executive dual task, while more nuanced influence 
of the VSSP was also found.  By contrast, the VSSP dual task setting was found to be the 
principle source of influence on enumeration processes.  Further, the influence of 
secondary task completion was limited to the RT data; accuracy in both primary tasks 
well exceeded 95% overall. 
 Importantly, although the completion of secondary task demands influenced 
primary task performance in meaningful ways, little evidence was found supporting a 
conclusion that primary task completion influenced performance in the secondary task 
recall portion of the experiments.  A comparison of the figures related to secondary task 
RTs between experiments (Figures 3 and 11) as well as percent error (Figures 4 and 14) 
supports this claim; the secondary task x working memory load interactions were close 
reflections of one another.  The exception to this claim was the finding that the number of 
objects enumerated did influence secondary task performance if the set sizes belonged to 
the counting range.  Importantly, however, the secondary task x working memory load x 
set size interaction does not reveal differential influence of set size between secondary 
tasks.  Instead, it appears that set size most strongly interacted with working memory 
load, which was influenced differentially by the secondary task.  Thus, the results 
obtained support the idea that the mechanisms employed during the completion of the 
primary tasks are not crucially dependent on the resources of the working memory 
system unless explicit counting procedures are employed.  Even with this exception, the 
influence of the primary task demands on the secondary task performance was minimal. 
 The performance associated with individual differences of the samples revealed 
that math anxiety was associated with differences in comparison and enumeration 
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performance.  That is, those who reported higher levels of math anxiety were found to 
incur larger dual task costs associated with concurrent visuospatial processing during 
comparison than were the low math anxious of the sample in Experiment 1.  In 
Experiment 2, the high math anxious participants’ performance showed steeper counting 
functions than their low math anxious peers.  Importantly, Experiment 1 did not fully 
replicate previous work; a significant math anxiety x numerical distance interaction was 
not found as shown in Maloney et al. (2010).  In contrast, Experiment 2 did replicate the 
math anxiety x set size interaction within the counting range of the enumeration 
continuum (Maloney et al., 2010); however, these effects were eliminated after including 
the math achievement scores of the individuals as a covariate in follow-up analyses.  This 
latter result suggests that the relationship between math anxiety and explicit counting 
procedures was fully mediated by a characteristic associated with the mathematical 
competency of the participants.   
Despite some inconsistencies between the results presented here and those 
reported by Maloney and colleagues, the two lines of research do agree on the idea that 
the present understanding of mathematics anxiety does not fully account for the effects 
obtained.  In the next section, I will describe the founding principles of the math anxiety 
construct and how the present results are in conflict with their implications.  Importantly, 
to follow is a description of the extensions applied to the base theory (extension: 
Attentional Control Theory; Eysenck et al., 2007) and an explanation of the current 
results in the context of this extended theory.  As a preview, it will be argued here that 
both the present and previously published results pertaining to low level processing are 
well described by principles concerning attentional resource allocation.  Further, it is 
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believed that this approach is favorable to those in the literature due to the new avenues 
of research to be pursued following this novel interpretation. 
Mathematics Anxiety and the Processing Efficiency Theory 
 The current theory describing math anxiety specifies that the worry, stress, and 
negative ruminations experienced in a math task serve to reduce the amount of working 
memory resources that are available to be utilized for the completion of a mentally 
challenging task (Ashcraft & Moore, 2009).  As such, we have argued that this “affective 
drop” in working memory function leads to poorer performance in math tasks requiring 
substantial working memory assistance (Moore & Ashcraft, 2013).  In essence, the 
demands present in a dual task procedure are augmented by additional resource 
competition brought on by anxiety, thus creating a triple task scenario. 
The primary implications of the affective drop is that math anxiety should be 
related to increasing deficits in performance as the task being completed becomes more 
working memory intensive.  As Maloney and colleagues report, however, neither number 
comparison nor enumeration fit the bill for such a description of working memory 
dependence.  Indeed, the literature supporting the affective drop comes from reports 
demonstrating the high math anxious disadvantage in arithmetic calculation of large 
numbers and the carry operation (e.g. Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001), or in tasks utilizing an 
unpracticed novel procedure (modular arithmetic; Mattarella-Micke et al., 2011).  
Because of the relative ease of comparison and enumeration, Maloney et al. suggested 
that the typical working memory deficit hypothesis was not the appropriate conclusion to 
be applied to the differences obtained between high and low math anxious participants.  
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Instead, the authors drew the conclusion that perhaps a fundamental difference in 
numerical competency was driving their effects. 
 The major theoretical position of the math anxiety construct is based on the 
application of Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) Processing Efficiency Theory, as applied by 
Ashcraft and colleagues (e.g., Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001).  The theory was easily adaptable 
for use in math anxiety, as it described potential routes through which generalized anxiety 
impaired cognitive task performance (although related, math anxiety is thought to be a 
separate construct from other forms of anxiety: Hembree, 1990).  Two main assumptions 
were asserted by the Processing Efficiency Theory.  First, anxiety was assumed to affect 
the efficiency (RT) of processing as opposed to its effectiveness (accuracy).  The idea 
was that the worry associated with anxiety (e.g. negative ruminations, distressing 
thoughts) consumed crucial working memory resources by way of compensatory 
strategies employed by the individual to cope with the troublesome cognitions.  
Assuming the individual is able to utilize resources to accommodate this compensation, 
the speed of task-relevant processing will be slowed, as if the participant’s anxiety serves 
to create a dual task testing environment (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Eysenk & Calvo, 1992, 
see also Lyons & Beilock, 2012b).  Processing effectiveness was thought to be 
diminished if the individual is unable to sufficiently engage in these strategies; the 
participant is not able to employ the requisite cognitive resources to cope with the anxiety 
and task demands.  The second major assumption of the Processing Efficiency Theory 
identifies the central executive of working memory as being the component most 
susceptible to the negative effects of worry; the claim was that the central executive 
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would be unable to inhibit the worrying thoughts (e.g., Hopko, Ashcraft, & Gute, 
Ruggiero, & Lewis, 1998). 
 Until most recently, Eysenck and Calvo’s theory served the math anxiety 
literature well.  As described, math anxiety investigations have routinely found that the 
high math anxious disadvantage is most apparent in situations that place a large amount 
of processing demand on the working memory system (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Lyons & 
Beilock, 2012; Mattarella-Micke et al., 2011).  Further, although the math cognition 
literature has yet to tie these deficits specifically to the central executive, the sound 
assumption can be made given the working memory review provided in the introduction 
of this work; the central executive is widely implicated in the completion of the 
arithmetic tasks utilized in the literature (for in-depth reviews see DeStefano & LeFevre, 
2004; Raghubar et al., 2010). 
 Importantly, however, the Processing Efficiency Theory can only be loosely 
applied to the anxiety differences found in number comparison and enumeration.  The 
difficulty is that (until the present study) the field has not established the exact processing 
demands of number comparison processing and enumeration processes are not considered 
to be heavily reliant on the working memory system (Maloney et al., 2010; 2011).  Even 
if the counting range is specifically considered, intuition alone is enough to reason that 
the task’s working memory demands pale in comparison to those of two-column addition 
with the carry operation.  These ideas are supported in the present experiments, as 
comparison processes were not found to influence secondary task performance, and the 
little influence enumeration did have was not attributable to individual differences in the 
sample.  This latter point is important because other tasks known to tax the working 
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memory system tend to elicit impaired performance in secondary task completion (e.g., 
Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001).   
As such, these results provide patterns for which the conventional theory of math 
anxiety cannot be applied to differential performance attributed to the math anxiety of the 
individuals tested.  If the theory is to explain the low level differences obtained, then it 
will need to be updated to describe how such effects should be expected.  Fortunately, 
such an updated perspective is offered in the recent extension of Eysenck and Calvo’s 
(1992) model: the Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007).  While overlap 
between the perspectives exists, the inclusion of attentional control in particular is quite 
helpful for the explanation of the present study’s results as well as those in the extant 
literature.   
Attentional Control Theory 
 At the surface level, the Attentional Control Theory maintains the two 
assumptions that processing efficiency is the component of performance primarily 
affected by anxiety (as opposed to processing effectiveness) and that the central executive 
is the component most affected by anxious interference.  The important extension of the 
theory is that it provides thorough and empirically supported claims regarding the 
mechanisms by which anxiety (and associated worry) disrupts the functioning of the 
central executive in cognitive tasks.  The basis for the updated account comes from the 
implications of the two major attentional systems outlined by Corbetta and Schulman 
(2002): the top-down, goal-oriented system and the bottom-up, stimulus-driven system.  
Importantly, the goal-oriented system is characterized by activations in prefrontal areas 
thought to reflect executive function (e.g. task switching and inhibition), while the 
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stimulus-driven system is described as reflecting the activation of key temporo-parietal 
areas that are associated with the filtering and detection of salient stimuli relevant to the 
goals of the current task. 
 Eysenck and colleagues assert that the presence of anxiety creates an imbalance 
between these attentional systems in favor of the stimulus-driven system.  Critically, this 
imbalance in the highly anxious individual is thought to result in heightened focus on the 
source of the anxiety.  This principle is supported by research indicating that highly 
anxious individuals preferentially engage in threat-related stimuli as compared to their 
low anxious peers (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).  Importantly, the theory 
claims that this bottom-up attentional preference for threat can be focused on either 
internal (negative ruminations) or external (fear-inducing stimuli) sources of threat.  
Further, the imbalance of attentional resource allocation leads to reduced attentional 
priority on the goal-relevant aspects of the task (attentional set: Corbetta & Schulman, 
2002), thus starving the central executive of resources needed for crucial activities such 
as task switching or inhibition of irrelevant stimuli.  More broadly, the heightened 
priority on the source of threat serves to reduce attentional control. 
 To connect these ideas to the experience of mathematics anxiety, the field must 
substantiate the idea that highly math anxious individuals view components of 
mathematical thought as being threatening.  Reports in the literature support this claim.  
For example, Mattarella-Micke et al. (2011) found that increases in cortisol levels, a 
physiological marker for stressful arousal in humans (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005), during 
math problem solving in a novel task was related to worse performance in high math 
anxious participants compared to their low anxious peers.  Further, the first fMRI study in 
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developmental math anxiety showed that the children with higher levels of math anxiety 
were recorded as having greater activation in the basolateral nucleus of the left amygdala 
during problem solving than their low math anxious counterparts (Young, Wu, & Menon, 
2012).  Importantly, this site of activation has previously been linked to learned fear 
response in human adults (Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004), and the authors 
showed that functional connectivity between this region and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex was stronger in the high math anxious children, suggesting the activation of a 
network believed to be implicated in the regulation of negative emotion (Phelps et al., 
2004).  In further support of the Attentional Control Theory, Young and colleagues found 
lower activation in parietal areas thought to be responsible for mathematical thought 
within the high than low math anxious children, which supports the theory’s claim that 
anxiety reduces attentional control in favor of the threat (anxiety) than task demands 
(manipulating number).  Perhaps most convincingly, Lyons & Beilock (2012a) found that 
the simple anticipation of mathematical calculation is enough to engage neural networks 
related to the expectation of physical harm.  
 Because worry impairs executive processing (Eysenck, 1992; Morris, Davis, & 
Hutchings, 1981), the theory claims that anxiety should be most disruptive in tasks 
requiring the central executive’s assistance.  This claim seems to be supported by the 
present investigation; suggesting reason for why both the high and low math anxious 
individuals were found to incur significant dual task costs while under concurrent central 
executive load, but only the high anxious exhibited costs during concurrent visuospatial 
load.  Recall that the task variant administered in this study required participants to 
compare one digit presented on the screen with the magnitude of the standard that was 
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continually held in working memory.  The dual task cost analysis of comparison RT 
indicated that both the low and high math anxious participants experienced similar levels 
of processing interference when confronted with a central executive dual task setting.  
This result is interpreted to reflect the interference experienced in switching the focus of 
attention between the stored magnitude representation and the digit presented on the 
screen.  Importantly, Eysenck et al., (2007) describes that a task does not need to be 
overwhelmingly working memory intensive to observe anxiety group differences.   
 Given the demonstration of executive attention requirements in comparison 
processes, it stands to reason that high math anxious individuals may still suffer from 
executive impairments due to worry associated with anxiety even when the central 
executive is not extrinsically taxed.  With this assumption in mind, the high math anxious 
would still experience the imbalance in attentional system prioritization that favors the 
bottom-up processing of threat, which would neglect the task demands of communication 
between the stored magnitude and stimulus magnitude for comparison.  Given 
frameworks within math cognition that describe the storage of magnitude in visual mental 
codes (e.g., Walsh, 2003), it appears that the high math anxious disadvantage in the 
VSSP dual task setting would reflect, on top of attentional system impairments, the 
inability to efficiently manipulate the standard’s maintained magnitude for use in each 
trial’s comparison.  Note that this would not occur for the low math anxious participants 
because the task is not appreciably working memory demanding, and concurrent 
visuospatial processing would not interrupt the crucial function of controlling processing 
to favor the attentional set of the task (comparison).  This interpretation further suggests 
that the magnitudes compared may not be relevant in the high math anxious participants’ 
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impaired performance, which is further reflected in the present study with the absence of 
the math anxiety x numerical distance interaction.  Importantly, this stands in 
contradiction to the effect reported by Maloney et al. (2011).  This discrepancy will be 
further explored later in the discussion. 
 Importantly, the Attentional Control Theory does appear to (at least partially) 
accommodate the effects obtained in the enumeration task as well.  Recall that the results 
obtained revealed that mathematics anxiety was related to the performance recorded, 
however the effect was isolated to the counting range of the task.  Similar results were 
found by Maloney et al. (2010). 
 Enumeration processes, especially those of subitizing, are reliant on stimulus-
driven attention (Ansari et al., 2007; Egeth, Leonard, & Palomares, 2008; Olivers & 
Watson, 2008; Pincham & Szűcs, 2012; Poiese, Spalek, & Di Lollo, 2008; Vuokko, 
Niemivirta, & Helenius, 2013; Xu & Liu, 2008).  Importantly, neurological evidence 
suggests that the attentional systems outlined by Corbetta and Schulman (2002) and 
utilized in the Attentional Control Theory are also implicated in the completion of 
enumeration tasks.  For example, Ansari et al. (2007) had participants compare the 
magnitudes of either symbolic (Arabic digits) or non-symbolic (collections of objects) 
stimuli whose values were either subitized (1-4 in total) or estimated (stimuli of 10, 20, 
30, and 40 in total).  Importantly, brain scans were recorded during task completion to 
allow for an examination of the neural correlates associated with the processes of 
subitization and estimation.  The results obtained from functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) revealed that the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) was more 
strongly engaged during the comparison of two subitizeable displays of non-symbolic 
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magnitude than in the comparison of estimated quantities.  Importantly, the TPJ is 
implicated in the bottom-up attentional system described here (Corbetta & Schulman, 
2002).  Most interesting was that this region was actually suppressed during the 
comparison of estimated quantities, and the authors found that the rate of suppression 
observed correlated with the speed of the comparison of the two stimuli. 
 Ansari et al. reasoned that the activation and suppression of the rTPJ suggest the 
efficient employment of the stimulus-driven and goal-oriented systems of attention.  The 
explanation offered was that stimulus-driven attention (rTPJ) is needed in the evaluation 
of subitizeable sets, as the exact quantity must be known for accurate comparison.  By 
contrast, this region is not needed in the comparison of estimated sets because the 
identification of precise stimulus features does not efficiently contribute to the accurate 
comparison of uncounted sets of objects.  The correlation between the RT of comparison 
and the suppression of this area further supported these claims.  The authors reasoned that 
suppression of the rTPJ would be beneficial to the participants in estimation and that 
more efficient suppression of the stimulus-driven attentional system would help to 
maximally engage the top-down processing of the large sets of objects to guide accurate 
comparisons.  Of note were results showing that these patterns were not implicated in the 
comparison of symbolic magnitudes, suggesting that the activations described did not 
reflect the appreciation of the numerical qualities of the task or comparison processing.   
With regard to the relationship between subitizing and counting mechanisms as 
tested in the present study, Vuokko et al. (2013) tested participants in a 
magnetoencephylography (MEG) study investigating the processes employed during 
enumeration.  Their results demonstrated that posterior temporo-parietal areas reached 
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peak activation during subitizing.  By contrast, they also found that activation in frontal 
regions presumed to be related to attentional control grew as enumeration extended 
beyond the subitizing range.   
These two neurological studies suggest that the two attentional systems of interest 
are intimately linked to the processes employed by enumeration mechanisms.  As such, 
the implications of the Attentional Control Theory can be applied to the present study’s 
results.  Recall that differences in math anxiety groups were obtained within the counting 
range of the task.  Given the evidence that attentional control is more strongly implicated 
in set sizes that extend beyond the subitizing range, it is offered here that the high math 
anxious disadvantage is the result of the imbalance of attentional systems described by 
Eysenck et al. (2007).  That is, highly math anxious participants were likely unable to 
disengage focus of bottom-up attention as efficiently as their low anxious peers, thus 
impairing the attentional control needed to switch attentional focus for efficient 
enumeration.   
With these ideas in mind, it is important to identify a need or use of top-down 
processing within the counting range to help substantiate this proposed impairment in the 
high math anxious participants.  Such evidence is potentially provided in what is known 
as the end effect (e.g., Trick, 2008).  Essentially, the end effect is reflected in the 
latencies of participants’ performance within the counting range, which is characterized 
by a steadily increasing RT slope as the number of enumerated items increases.  This 
characterization, however, does not typically hold for the final and largest set size 
sampled; instead, latencies for this largest quantity are typically as fast, if not slightly 
faster than the set size just prior in total.  Trick (2008) described the effect as reflecting 
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participants’ ability to infer the numerical scope of the task and form accurate guessing 
strategies of response when large numbers of items are to be enumerated (Mandler & 
Shebo, 1982).  Thus, the participant can merely infer that the largest set to be enumerated 
is nine, for example, and can accurately guess that a large set consists of nine objects 
once enumeration of seven or eight is accomplished with more objects remaining.  
Because this effect implies the use of a cognitive strategy in place of explicit 
enumeration, researchers commonly exclude the largest set size in analysis of 
performance (e.g., Trick & Pylyshyn, 1993). 
The reasoning from the Attentional Control Theory would suggest that, if highly 
math anxious participants suffer from an imbalance of attentional system engagement 
that favors focus on the anxiety experienced (as opposed to goal-directed attention), then 
the end effect should be absent in their latencies, as explicit counting requires the use of 
efficient attentional control (e.g., Vuokko et al., 2013).  Indeed, inspection of Figure 10 
from this study shows just that.  Recall that the secondary task x set size x math anxiety 
interaction revealed overall slower enumeration in the high math anxious participants as 
compared to the low math anxious, and that the high math anxious individuals were 
especially impaired in the VSSP dual task setting.  In comparison to the low math 
anxious, it can now be seen that the latency associated with eight objects (the largest in 
the task) in the VSSP task is substantially larger than those in the other secondary task 
settings, as well as in comparison to the latencies corresponding to the set size of seven 
recorded in all settings.  From these results, it would appear that the heightened priority 
placed on the stimulus-driven attentional system impaired the use of the top-down end 
effect strategy when additional visuospatial resources were in demand.  
  76 
These results are promising and suggest the appropriateness of interpreting low 
level differences between math anxiety groups in the context of the Attentional Control 
Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007).  To summarize, the theory asserts that the presence of 
anxiety during cognitive testing results in a misallocation of attentional resources that 
favor focus on the source of threat and experience of worry and reduces attentional focus 
on goal-oriented attentional mechanisms.  These findings are substantiated by reports 
indicating that highly anxious individuals demonstrate preferential engagement in threat-
inducing stimuli (e.g., Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) and lack the ability to 
efficiently inhibit distracting information (Hopko et al., 1998).  Importantly, the 
Attentional Control Theory is an extension of the Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck 
& Calvo, 1992) that served as the basis for the development of mathematics anxiety 
theory.  The present work applied these extended ideas to the construct of mathematics 
anxiety to support results indicating that high math anxious individuals were impaired in 
tasks that are not particularly working memory demanding, but still require efficient 
attentional processing.   
Despite these important extensions of the math anxiety construct, however, 
important concerns in the present experiments have not yet been resolved.  More 
specifically, the finding that the difference between high and low math anxious 
participants in the counting range of enumeration was mediated by mathematical 
achievement needs to be addressed.  As will be described in the following section, the 
implications of the present discussion provide for future directions to be explored within 
the proposed framework. 
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Future Directions 
 The discussion provided here presents a convincing account that the math anxiety 
differences found in the number comparison and enumeration tasks are related to the 
interaction between attentional systems during problem solving.  Future studies should 
continue to replicate these effects, and explore the breadth of the implications drawn 
here.  Of interest is the larger possibility that attentional mechanisms may underlie the 
development of mathematics anxiety in the first place, as the mathematical mechanisms 
tested here are honed early in development and are thought to form the basis for later 
mathematical achievement and success (Anobile, Stievano, & Burr, 2013; DeSmedt, 
Verschaffel, & Ghesquière, 2009; Landerl, Bevan, & Butterworth, 2004). 
 In a related idea for future research, the field needs to explore the possibility that 
such low level attentional deficits are in any way related to similar effects observed in 
developmental studies investigating the relationship between mathematical competency 
and attentional function (Anobile et al., 2013; Steele, Karmiloff-Smith, Cornish, & 
Scerif, 2012).  As an example, Steele et al., (2012) tested children’s ability to complete 
three tasks tapping into different aspects of attentional processing.  Their results showed 
that tests of sustained and selective attention produced behavior that was predictive of 
math achievement one year later, whereas a test of executive attention (spatial conflict) 
only predicted concurrent achievement.  Further, Anobile et al., (2013) found that the 
relationship between sustained attention and mathematical achievement were maintained 
after controlling for variables such as the child’s age, gender, and non-verbal ability.  
Importantly, the performance in the object tracking task did not relate to the reading 
ability of the same children.  These ideas were considered in the present experiment with 
  78 
the finding that differences between the high and low math anxious in the counting range 
of enumeration were found to be mediated by the mathematical achievement of the 
participants.  Below is a discussion of this result in the context of the attentional 
mechanisms explained here.  
 Recall that the math cognition literature reports robust negative relationships 
between math anxiety and achievement in both children (Ma, 1999) and adults (Hebree, 
1990).  Despite this important relationship, however, the field has taken few steps to 
examine the mechanisms underlying this connection.  What is known is that those 
individuals who report high levels of math anxiety tend to perform worse in standardized 
exams and laboratory tasks testing mathematical competency.  Further, high math 
anxious students report lower self-efficacy in the domain, express lower motivation to 
excel in its principles, and tend to avoid advanced math courses in their educational 
career.   
 As stated previously, enumeration, especially subitizing, has recently been 
established to primarily rely on visual attention (Egeth et al., 2008; Olivers & Watson, 
2008; Pincham & Szűcs, 2012; Poiese et al., 2008; Xu & Liu, 2008).  For example, Egeth 
et al. (2008) found that the ability to correctly identify the total of a subitizeable set size 
was greatly impaired if the set size was presented within the attentional blink.  The 
attentional blink is a phenomenon whereby visual attention is exhausted after the 
identification of one target in a stream of visual information, leaving the individual with 
little attentional resources to identify a second target if it is presented within a small time 
frame subsequent to the first target (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987). 
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 These points are important to consider in the context of the present enumeration 
experiment results, as high anxious individuals are believed to be biased toward the 
stimulus-driven attentional system and engage in threat.  More importantly, however, is 
developmental math cognition literature implicating efficient visual attention in 
concurrent and longitudinal success in mathematics (Anobile et al., 2013; Steele et al, 
2012).  These results suggest that maintaining and selectively allocating attentional 
resources are fundamental processes supporting growth in mathematical understanding.  
Because early math competency is believed to strongly predict future math achievement, 
it stands to reason that early deficits in attentional processing (and its connection to math 
achievement) would persist into adulthood, and may influence adults’ performance in 
low-level tasks such as those administered in the present study.  Thus, it is plausible that 
those who reported higher levels of math anxiety and also exhibited poor mathematical 
achievement may suffer from the over prioritization of stimulus-driven attention which 
may be faulty to begin with in those who are low achieving. 
 In an attempt to further substantiate the need to explore the relationships between 
math achievement, math anxiety, and attention, the subitizing results from Experiment 2 
were revisited to examine the possibility that math achievement, which mediated the 
relationship between math anxiety and counting performance, would also relate to the 
fast and accurate enumeration of small set sizes.  Recall that the DTC analyses from this 
experiment showed larger costs to processing in the subitizing range as compared to the 
counting range, suggesting that the attentional resources were taxed in the context of dual 
task processing.  Thus, it was predicted that the low achieving participants would be 
slower than their more highly achieving peers to subitize in a 3 (secondary task) x 3 
  80 
(working memory load) x 3 (set sizes 1-3) x 2 (math achievement group) ANOVA.  
Critically, the results revealed that the low achieving individuals in the sample (M = 
996ms) were significantly slower to subitize than their more highly achieving peers (M = 
821ms), F (1, 46) = 7.20, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .14.  Math achievement did not interact with the 
other factors in the design.  Thus, this result supports the possibility that the math anxiety 
x math achievement interaction is a critical factor in the performance profiles obtained in 
this task, and that it is potentially the altered attentional prioritization of high math 
anxiety and attentional deficits of the low math ability that explains the effects reported 
here and in the literature (Maloney, 2010). 
 The implication from this result is that the math anxiety x numerical distance 
interactions reported in Maloney et al. that were not found in the present study might be 
due to the sampling method differences between the two studies.  To be sure, the authors 
report recruiting participants from the top and bottom 25% of the math anxiety 
population.  By contrast, the present study recruited participants without prior knowledge 
of the individuals’ math anxiety scores and anxiety groups were determined by sample 
median split.  It is argued that, given the math anxiety/math achievement relationships 
outlined here and elsewhere (Hembree, 1990; Ma, 1999), that the steeper numerical 
distance effect observed in the high math anxious participants may relate more strongly 
to the poorer numerical competency of their high math anxiety group than effects related 
to the attentional concerns raised in this work.  Further, it is suggested that extreme 
sampling of individual difference groups may be misleading and should be avoided in 
future research addressing the relationships between math anxiety and math achievement 
in low level tasks. 
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APPENDIX: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction obtained in the primary 
task RT analysis of Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2.  Secondary task x working memory load x math anxiety group interaction from 
the primary task RT analyses in Experiment 1.  The figure is paneled by math anxiety 
group.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary task 
RT analyses in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4.  The Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary 
task percent error analyses in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 5.  Secondary task x math anxiety group interaction from the primary task dual 
task cost analyses in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary task 
dual task cost analyses in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7.  Secondary task x set size x math anxiety group interaction from the primary 
task RT analyses in Experiment 2.  The figure is paneled by math anxiety group.  Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 8.  Working memory load x set size interaction from the primary task RT analyses 
in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 9.  Working memory load x set size interaction from the primary task RT analyses 
within the counting range of enumeration in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure 10.  Secondary task x set size x math anxiety group interaction from the primary 
task RT analyses within the counting range in Experiment 2.  The figure is paneled by 
math anxiety group.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 11.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary task 
RT analyses in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 12.  Working memory load x set size interaction from the secondary task RT 
analyses in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 13.  Secondary task x working memory load x set size interaction from the 
secondary task RT analyses in Experiment 2.  The figure is paneled by secondary task.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 14.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary task 
percent error analyses in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 15.  Secondary task x working memory load interaction from the secondary task 
dual task cost analyses in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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